



# Authentication & Access Control Configuration Reference

13-October-2022

Release 5.4.x

Gerardo Ganis, CERN

Andreas-Joachim Peters, CERN

Andrew Hanushevsky, SLAC



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## 1 Introduction

This document describes the configuration of the security and the default access control components of the extended root daemon (**xrootd**). Configuration directives use a special prefix for each component that allows you to use a single configuration file. The prefixes are shown in the following table.

Component	Purpose
<b>sec</b>	Security authentication
<b>acc</b>	Access control (i.e., authorization)

Configuration directives for each component come from a configuration file specified when **xrootd** is started (see the **-c** option **xrootd** option).

*Records that do not start with a recognized identifier are ignored.* This includes blank record and comment lines (i.e., lines starting with a pound sign, #). This guide documents the **acc** and **sec** configuration directives. Other directives are documented in supplemental guide specific to the component they deal with.

Refer to the manual “**Configuration File Syntax**” on how to specify and use conditional directives and set variables. These features are indispensable for complex configuration files usually encountered in large installations.

By default, security and access control features are disabled. These features can be enabled with the following **xrootd** and **ofs** directives:

Directive	Purpose
<b>xrootd.fslib</b>	Load the shared library implementing the <b>ofs</b> and <b>acc</b> components.
<b>xrootd.seclib</b>	Load the shared library implementing the <b>sec</b> (authentication) component.
<b>ofs.authlib</b>	Load the shared library implementing a special <b>acc</b> component.
<b>ofs.authorize</b>	Enables access control, <b>acc</b> component.

## 1.1 Client/Server Authentication

The authentication component is structured as a highly versatile multi-protocol suite. In order to accomplish this task, it is organized into a set of shared libraries:

Shared Library	Purpose
<b>libXrdSec.so</b>	Protocol manager and host-based authentication.
<b>libXrdSecgsi.so</b>	Dynamically loadable GSI authentication.
<b>libXrdSeckrb5.so</b>	Dynamically loadable Kerberos V authentication.
<b>libXrdSecpwd.so</b>	Dynamically loadable password-based authentication.
<b>libXrdSecsss.so</b>	Dynamically loadable simple shared secret authentication.
<b>libXrdSecunix.so</b>	Dynamically loadable unix-based authentication.
<b>LibXrdSecxxxx.so</b>	Dynamically loadable xxxx authentication protocol.

This means that **libXrdSec.so** must be available since it is needed to boot-strap additional protocols. The corresponding shared library must be available for each requested protocol (e.g., **krb5**).

For *servers*, the location of **libXrdSec.so** is specified using the **xroot seclib** directive (see the “**xrd & xrootd** Configuration Guide”). Additional libraries are specified using the **sec.protocol** directive documented in this guide.

For *clients*, the task of deploying shared libraries is more problematic because library placement and location is not immediately obvious. The same rules apply; **libXrdSec.so** and any additional protocol libraries must be available. Typically, these libraries should be placed in one of the directories listed in the client’s **LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH** environmental variable or installed in the default loader’s search path. Alternatively, they can be placed in a well-known linker/loader location (e.g., `/usr/local/lib`).

The client will load libraries, as available, compatible with the security configuration defined for the server. Thus, the server controls what protocols the client will use, if any. While this potentially simplifies security administration, it does complicate the client-side environment. This is because the client may be potentially running multiple protocols at the same time, depending on what set of servers the client wants to use. Generally, however, this is transparent to the client application.

## 1.2 Server Authorization

The default authorization component is already built into **xrootd** and needs only to be activated using the **ofs.authorize** directive. If you use the default authorization scheme, you must also create an authorization file that lists client capabilities. The file is specified by the **acc.authdb** directive. Procedures must be developed to properly share this file with all of the servers that rely on it to provide cohesive access control. Fortunately, authorization is only a server-side issue.

Other authorization schemes may be used with **xrootd**. A specific scheme is implemented as a plug-in. The shared library containing the implementation is then specified using the **ofs.authlib** directive.

In a clustered environment, authorization should be enabled on all actual data servers since clients might bypass a redirector and communicate directly with a data server. Consider enabling authorization at the redirector level only if you need to control file requests. Since a request for a file does not implicitly allow actual access to file data; authorization at the redirector level generally does not enhance security but may add significant overhead.



## 2 Authentication Configuration

### 2.1 entitylib

```
ofs.entitylib [++] path [parms]
```

#### Function

Specify the location of the client entity decryption post processor.

#### Parameters

**++** The specified plug-in should stack on top of the existing plug-in or default. A stacked plug-in cannot be overridden by a subsequent directive.

*path* The absolute path to the shared library that contains an implementation of the post processor plug-in.

*parms* Optional parameters to be passed to the post processor plug-in

#### Defaults

By default no additional post processing occurs after the client is authenticated.

#### Notes

- 1) The entity post processor interface is defined in the **XrdSecEntityPin.hh** include file. Refer to this file on how to create a custom post processor.
- 2) Even though authentication has succeeded, the post processor may reject the authenticated entity. When authentication fails the message returned to the client, and perhaps printed in the log, may be sufficient to resolve which part of the authentication process actually failed.

#### Example

```
sec.entitylib /opt/xrootd/lib/libEntityProc.so
```

## 2.2 level

```
sec.level {all | local | remote} [relaxed] level [force]
level:    none | compatible | standard | intense | pedantic
```

### Function

Specify the request verification level.

### Parameters

**all** The verification level applies to all clients. This is the default.

**local** The verification level applies only to clients in the server's DNS domain.

### remote

The verification level applies only to clients outside the server's DNS domain.

### relaxed

applies the specified level of verification to clients that support request verification. Old clients that don't support verification are not included. This option is meant to allow a non-disruptive client software upgrade path.

*level* Is the verification level:

**none** requests are not to be verified. This is the default unless the **level** directive specifies otherwise.

### compatible

verifies only potentially destructive requests (i.e. those that modify file data or metadata. This provides backward compatibility for old clients that only require read-only access to data.

### standard

includes compatible verification plus key requests that access data.

### intense

includes standard verification plus additional requests that access metadata.

### pedantic

verifies all requests.

**force** requires verification even for authentication protocols that do not support encryption. Normally, when a client authenticates with a protocol that does not support generic encryption, verification is not employed. This option is meant for debugging purposes as it does not provide enhanced security.

### Defaults

`sec.level all none`

### Notes

- 1) Request verification uses cryptographic signing to ensure that a request has been sent by the client that the server has previously authenticated.
- 2) Request verification requires that the authentication protocol used to authenticate a client supports generic encryption. Currently, only **gsi** authentication protocol supports generic encryption.
- 3) A client is considered to be in the same DNS domain when all DNS name components, other than the first one, match corresponding name components of the server.
- 4) The following section specifies the verification used for each request by specified level other than none.

### Example

```
sec.level local none  
sec.level remote standard
```



### 2.2.1 Verification performed by level

Operation	Compatible	Standard	Intense	Pedantic
auth	---	---	---	---
bind	---	---	verified	verified
chmod	verified	verified	verified	verified
chkpoint	---	---	verified	verified
close	---	---	verified	verified
dirlist	---	---	---	verified
endsess	---	---	verified	verified
fattr	verified	verified	verified	verified
gppfile	verified	verified	verified	verified
locate	---	---	---	verified
login	---	---	---	---
mkdir	---	verified	verified	verified
mv	verified	verified	verified	verified
open read	---	verified	verified	verified
open Write	verified	verified	verified	verified
pgread	---	---	---	verified
pgwrite	---	---	verified	verified
ping	---	---	---	---
prepare	---	---	---	verified
protocol	---	---	---	---
query	---	---	---	verified
query special	---	---	verified	verified
read	---	---	---	verified
readv	---	---	---	verified
rm	verified	verified	verified	verified
rmdir	verified	verified	verified	verified
set	---	---	verified	verified
set special	verified	verified	verified	verified
sig ver	---	---	---	---
stat	---	---	---	verified
statx	---	---	---	verified
sync	---	---	---	verified
truncate	verified	verified	verified	verified
write	---	---	verified	verified



## 2.3 protbind

```
sec.protbind hostpat { none | [ only ] protocols }  
hostpat: prefix[*][suffix] | [prefix][*]suffix | localhost
```

### Function

Bind a set of protocols to one or more hosts.

### Parameters

#### *hostpat*

The hostname pattern to be used for matching host names. A pattern is a standard DNS name with an optional single asterisk somewhere in the specification. All of the characters prior to the asterisk (i.e., *prefix*) must match the left-most characters of the host name and all of the characters after the asterisk (i.e., *suffix*) must match the right-most characters of the host name. If the *hostpat* does not contain an asterisk, the all of the characters must match.

**none** Indicates that incoming clients from hosts matching *hostpat* need not supply any credentials.

**only** Indicates that incoming clients from hosts matching *hostpat* must supply credentials using one of the *protocols* that follow.

#### *protocols*

One or more blank-separated protocol ids that are to be bound to the host. Each protocol id must have been previously defined with the **protocol** directive.

#### **localhost**

substitutes the DNS registered name of the current host.

## Defaults

All of the defined protocols are presented to each connecting client as acceptable authentication protocols. See the notes on how to change the default.

## Notes

- 1) The **protbind** directive allows you to determine which authentication protocols are valid from which host. Alternatively, the **protbind** directive can be used to lessen authentication requirements from certain hosts (e.g., those behind a firewall vs. the ones outside a firewall).
- 2) Incoming clients from hosts bound to **none** are not asked to supply credentials.
- 3) Order is important. Host matching occurs in reverse order of specification. Specify the most general *hostpat* first and the least general, last.
- 4) If the *hostpat* is a single asterisk, then this defines the actual default for all unbound hosts.
- 5) The **protbind** directive is meant to lessen the security requirements on certain hosts. Unless **only** is specified, it does not restrict a host from using any defined security protocol, even if that protocol is not presented to the host as an option.
- 6) Because **host** protocol is the least restrictive authentication mechanism, binding the built-in **host** protocol to a host makes any other bindings to the host superfluous.

## Example

```
sec.protbind bronco*slac.stanford.edu host
```

## 2.5 protocol

```
sec.protocol [ libpath ] protid [ parms ]
```

### Function

Define the characteristics of an authentication protocol.

### Parameters

#### *libpath*

The absolute path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader's search path or the **LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH** environmental variable.

*protid* The unique 1- to 7-character protocol identifier.

*parms* The parameters required by the protocol to operate successfully. The parameters are protocol dependent. The notes and subsequent sections describe the parameters needed for various protocols. The *parms* can also be specified with the **protparm** directive.

### Defaults

There are no defaults. Each protocol must be appropriately defined in order for it to be used.

### Notes

- 1) Each supported protocol has a 1- to 4-character unique identifier, the *protid*. The **sec** component currently comes with support for these protocols:
  - **host** authenticates a user by originating host name only,
  - **gsi** authenticates a user using GSI protocol,
  - **krb5** authenticates a user using Kerberos V protocol, and
  - **pwd** authenticates a user using a password-based protocol
  - **sss** authenticates a user using a simple shared secret protocol
  - **unix** authenticates using the Unix login name and group name
 Other protocols may be supported by an installation. Refer to the "xrootd Developer's Reference" on how to add new protocol support.
- 2) Even though the host protocol is built-in, it will not be used unless specified with a **protocol** directive.

- 3) Because **host** protocol is the least restrictive authentication mechanism; allowing its unbound use (see the **protbind** directive) makes all other protocols superfluous. A warning message is issued if you define the host protocol but do not restrict its use to certain hosts.
- 4) The following sections describe the required parameters, *parms*, for each protocol requiring configuration (**host** protocol does not need any parameters).
- 5) **Warning:** **host** and **unix** protocols do not provide any significant level of security and should only be used in instances where security violations do not matter.

### Example

```
sec.protocol host
```

## 2.5.1 gsi protocol

```

sec.protocol [libpath] gsi [basic] [authz] [gmap] [voms]

basic:    [-ca:{noverify|verifyss|verify}]

           [-cert:file]           [-certdir:dir]

           [-cipher:ciphers]

           [-crl:{ignore|try|use[,updt] |require[,updt]}]

           [-crldir:dir]

           [-crlext:extension] [-crlrefresh:period]

           [-d:level]           [-dlgpxy:{ignore|request}]

           [-exppxy:{template | =creds}]

           [-key:file]           [-md:mds]

           [-trustdns:{true|false}]

authz:   [-authzfun:file]       [-authzfunparms:parms]

           [-authzpxy:{cred|endor}={fullchain|lastcert}]

           [-authzto:to]         [-authzcall:{always|novoms}]

gmap:    [-gmapfun:file]       [-gmapfunparms:parms]

           [-gmapopt:{nomap[,usedn] |trymap[,usedn] |usemap}]

           [-gmapto:to]         [-gridmap:file]

voms:    [-vomsat:{ignore|extract|require}]

           [-vomsfun:{file|default}]

           [-vomsfunparms:parms]

```

## Function

Define the characteristics of the **gsi** authentication protocol.

## Parameters

### *libpath*

The absolute directory path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by loader or the **LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH** environmental variable.

## **basic Options**

### **-ca:{noverify|verifyss|verify}**

Defines the CA verification level:

**noverify** do not verify;

**verifyss** verify if self-signed, issuing a warning if not;

**verify** always verify the CA in the chain, failing when not possible.

Default is **verifyss**.

### **-cert:file**

Specifies an alternative path for the file containing the certificate to be used by the server; the path leading to *file* can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; '~/' is expanded to \$HOME.

Default: **/etc/grid-security/xrd/xrdcert.pem**

### **-certdir:dir**

Specifies an alternative directory path for trusted Certificate Authority certificates; the path indicated by *dir* can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; '~/' is expanded to \$HOME.

Default: **/etc/grid-security/certificates**

### **-cipher:ciphers**

Specifies a colon-separated list of ciphers to be used for the session symmetric key. Default is "**aes-128-cbc:bf-cbc:des-ede3-cbc**" (OpenSSL naming convention).

**-crl:** {**ignore** | **try** | **use**[,**updt**] | **require**[,**updt**]}

Defines the type of check to be performed on CRLs:

- ignore**     *ignore* any CRL information for the CA being used for certificate chain verification;
- try**         *try* to use CRL *if available*; if the CRL certificate is missing for a given CA, the related CRL is assumed to be empty;
- use**         *use* CRL for any trusted CA, but do not fail if the CRL certificate is not up-to-date;
- require**     *require* an *up-to-date* CRL for each CA;
- updt**         attempt to download missing or expired CRLs. Unless **updt** is specified, no attempt is made to update the CRLs.

Default is **try**.

**-crl***dir:dir*

Specifies an alternative directory path for CRL certificates; the path indicated by *dir* can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; '~/' is expanded to \$HOME. By the default CRLs are searched for in the *same path as for CA certificates*.

**-crl***ext:extension*

Specifies an alternative default extension for CRL files. Default is ".r0".

**-crl***refresh:period*

Controls *period* for refreshing the CRL information; value in seconds. Negative values disable the automatic refresh. Default one day (86400 secs).

**-d:***level*

Sets the verbosity level for this module to *level*; the level can be set to 1 (low), 2 (medium) or 3 (high or dump). Invoking **xrootd** with the verbose option **-d** sets the internal verbosity for this module to 1.

Default is 0.

**-dlgpxy: {ignore | request}**

Specify if the server should request a delegated proxy from the client:

**ignore** do not ask the client for a delegated proxy certificate;

**request** ask the client for a delegated proxy; the result depends on the setting of the client's [XrdSecGSIDELEGPXY](#) environment variable.

Default is **ignore**.

**-exppxy:template or exppxy:=creds**

Specifies the exported location of the delegated proxy certificate when the **dlgpxy** switch enables it. Specifying a *template* writes the certificate to a file whose name corresponds to the *template* specification. Specifying **=creds** makes the certificate available via the **XrdSecEntity.creds** with the length set in the **XrdSecEntity.credslen** field.

A *template* can contain one or more of the following place-holders which are resolved dynamically:

<b>&lt;user&gt;</b>	client username;
<b>&lt;uid&gt;</b>	client user ID;
<b>&lt;host&gt;</b>	client host name;
<b>&lt;vorg&gt;</b>	client virtual organization;
<b>&lt;group&gt;</b>	client group.

Default is **/tmp/x509up\_u<uid>**.

**-key:file**

Specifies an alternative path for the file containing the private key associated with the server certificate (server must have read access to the file) ; the path leading to *file* can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; '~/' is expanded to \$HOME.

Default: **/etc/grid-security/xrd/xrdkey.pem**

**-md:mds**

Specifies a colon-separated list of message digests to be used for integrity checks and signatures. Default is **sha1:md5** (*OpenSSL* naming convention).

**-trustdns:{true | false}**

Specifies whether or not to use the Domain Name System (**DNS**) to validate hostnames in certificates. This may need to occur if the certificate does not have a **SAN** extension or the hostname is an alias. See the usage notes for admonitions. The default is **false**.

**authz Options****-authzcall: {always|novoms}**

specifies when the **authzfun** plug-in should be called:

**always** the plug-in is always called;

**novoms** the plug-in is only called when the **vomsfun** plug-in fails.

Default is **always** and is the case when no **vomsfun** plug-in exists.

**-authzfun:file**

*file* is the full path of the shared library containing a plug-in to be called after a successful authentication handshake to complete the identity information.

**-authzfunparms:parms**

*parms* are the parameters to be used to initialize the plug-in defined by **authzfun**.

**-authzpxy: {cred|endor}={fullchain|lastcert}**

specifies how the **authzfun** proxy information is exported in the **XrdSecEntity** structure:

**cred** place in the **XrdSecEntity.creds** field;

**endor** place in the **XrdSecEntity.endorsements** field;

**fullchain** use the full proxy chain (CA, certificate, proxies)

**lastcert** use only the last user proxy certificate.

Default is to not export proxy information.

**-authzto:to**

Expiration time in seconds for entries in the cache associated with the authorization function defined by **authzfun**. Default is 43200 seconds, i.e. 12 hours.

## ***gmap*** Options

### **-gmapfun:***file*

*file* is the full path of the shared library containing a plug-in function to be used to map DN's to usernames in addition to the grid-map file.

### **-gmapfunparms:***parms*

Defines the parameters to be used to initialize the plug-in mapping function defined by **gmapfun**; multiple parameters are ' '|-separated. See the dedicated section below for details.

### **-gmapopt:** {**nomap**[,**usedn**] | **trymap**[,**usedn**] | **usemap**}

Specify how to handle the grid-map file.

**nomap** do not map; use the hash of the client's DN as the user identifier (username);

**trymap** try to map the DN but if unsuccessful use the hash of the client's DN as the user identifier (username);

**usemap** require mapping (fail at initialization if file is missing or not readable and fail if a DN mapping cannot be found);

**usedn** use the client DN as the user identifier instead of a hash.

Default is **trymap**.

### **-gmapto:***to*

Expiration time in seconds for entries in the cache associated with the grid-map file or the mapping function defined by **gmapfun**.

Default is -1, i.e. no expiration.

### **-gridmap:***file*

Specify an alternative location for the grid-map to be searched for if **gmapopt** is non null.

Default is **/etc/grid-security/grid-mapfile**.

**voms Options****vomsat: {ignore|extract|require}**

specify how to handle **VOMS** attributes using the **vomsfun** plug-in:

- ignore** ignore, i.e. do not look for **VOMS** extensions (**ignore** is changed to **require** when **-vomsfun** is specified);
- extract** extract all attributes and, if successful, fill in **XrdSecEntity.vorg**, **XrdSecEntity.role**, **XrdSecEntity.grps** fields, setting **XrdSecEntity.endorsements** to the full attribute list. Do not fail if attributes cannot be extracted;
- require** like **extract** but fail if the attributes are missing or cannot be extracted.

Default is **ignore**.

**vomsfun: {file|default}**

specifies the location of the **voms** plug-in:

- file* is the full path if a shared library containing a plug-in function to be called to extract information from the **VOMS** certificate extension;
- default** use the default [extractor](#) that comes with the **gsi** package.

Default is **default** when the **extract** or **require** option is in effect.

**vomsfunparms:parms**

*parms* are the parameters to be used to initialize the plug-in **VOMS** attributes extraction function defined by **vomsfun** option. Multiple parameters are '|' separated.

**Defaults**

See description of each single option.

## Notes

- 1) Servers usually use a dedicated service-certificate whose **CN** is of the form  
CN = *service/Fully.Qualified.Hostname*  
e.g. CN = xrd/pcepsft43.cern.ch  
However, this is no longer sufficient as the current standard dictates that a server's host certificate should have a **SAN** extension containing the actual full qualified host name regardless of what the **CN** contains.
- 2) The **-crltext** option allows you to specify the **CRL** certificate files extension as using a specific extension speeds the loading of certificates. If the extension or the corresponding file is missing, the whole set of files in the directory is tested to find the relevant **CRL** files; which is a slow process.
- 3) The order in which various plug-ins are applied is:
  - a. The **gmap** plug-in if enabled by the **-gmapfun** option. Otherwise, gridmap file processing is applied if enabled by the **-gmapopt** option.
  - b. The **VOMS** plug-in if enabled by the **-vomsfun** option. Otherwise, the built-in **VOMS** extraction is used if enabled by the **-vomsat** option.
  - c. The **authz** plug-in if enabled by the **-authzfun** and **-authzcall** options.
- 4) The **-trustdns** option should only be used when needing to deal with certificates without a **SAN** extension or when the certificate contains an alias of the real hostname. These kinds of certificates are now considered to be malformed. Enabling **DNS** usage is a security issue as a **DNS** can be poisoned with false entries allowing a presented certificate to look as if it belongs to the host being contacted; when in fact it is a malicious intervening host. Avoid enabling **DNS** whenever possible.
- 5) For *developers only*: both the **gmap** and **authz** plug-ins support the special option **useglobals**. This option is detected and used *before* the plug-in is actually loaded and controls the way the symbols in the plug-in library are made available to subsequent libraries, e.g. the ones loaded by the plug-in itself. If **useglobals** is added to the option list the plug-in symbols are made globally available, which means that **dlopen** is called with the flag **RTLD\_GLOBAL** set. The **useglobals** option is removed from the option list passed to the initialization call.

## Example

```
sec.protocol gsi -crl:3
```

## Backward Compatibility

Starting in Release 5, the **-authzpxy**, **-ca**, **-crl**, **-dlgpxt**, **-gmapopt**, and **-vomsat** options were changed to accept meaningful words as parameters. To achieve backward compatibility, the original numeric values are still accepted. The following tables show how each numeric value maps onto a descriptive argument. Be aware that in previous releases invalid numeric arguments were usually silently ignored or converted to something more acceptable. Starting in Release 5, invalid numeric arguments are flagged as invalid and the substituted value (as a specification) is displayed.

<b>-authzpxy</b>		<b>-ca</b>		<b>-crl</b>	
<b>Value</b>	<b>Specification</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Specification</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Specification</b>
1	creds=fullchain	0	noverify	0	ignore
2	endor=fullchain	1	verifyss	1	try
11	creds=lastcert	2	verify	2	use
12	endor=lastcert			3	require
				12	try,updt
				13	require,updt

<b>-dlgpxy</b>		<b>-gmapopt</b>		<b>-vomsat</b>	
<b>Value</b>	<b>Specification</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Specification</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Specification</b>
0	ignore	0	nomap	0	ignore
1	request	1	trymap	1	extract
		2	usemap	2	require
		10	nomap,usedn		
		11	trymap,usedn		

## Backward Compatibility Changes

In Release 5, the built-in **VOMS** extractor is no longer available as it is not secure and may not correctly parse certain **VOMS** attributes. The default **-vomsat** value consequently changed from **extract** to **ignore**. This means that to extract **VOMS** attributes either **-vomsfun** must be specified or **-vomsat** set to **extract** or **require**.



### 2.5.1.1 The authz plug-in

The GSI package comes with a general-purpose **authz** plug-in implemented in the **libXrdSecgsiAuthzVO.so** shared library. It can be used for simple mapping of virtual organization (**VO**) names to usernames or groups. It also, by default, trims the un-mapped usernames to the base distinguished name contained in the certificate. These actions are controlled by the **authzfunparms** parameter. The parameter is specified in the form of a **CGI** string (i.e., *keyword=value* with each pair separated by an ampersand (&)). The parameters are as follows:

```
-authzfunparms : [keyword=value [&keyword=value [. . .]]]
keyword=value : [debug=1] [valido=voname [, voname [, ...]]]
                  [vo2grp=gspec] [vo2usr=uspec]
```

where:

#### **debug=1**

Prints additional information involved in the mapping and should only be used for debugging purposes.

#### **valido=olist**

*olist* is a comma-separated list of **VO** names that are acceptable. If not specified, all virtual organizations are accepted. Otherwise, failure is returned if the **VO** is not in the list.

#### **vo2grp=gspec**

*gspec* specifies how the **VO** name is to be converted into a group name. Specify for *gspec* a printf-like format string with a single **%s**. The **VO** name is inserted where the **%s** occurs. To make the group name equal to the **VO** name, specify only **%s** (i.e. **vo2grp=%s**). If **vo2grp** is not specified, the group name is unchanged.

**vo2usr=uspec**

*uspec* specifies how the **VO** name is to be converted into a user name. Specify for *uspec* a printf-like format string with a single **%s**. The **VO** name is inserted where the **%s** occurs. To make the user name equal to the **VO** name, specify only **%s** (i.e. **vo2usr=%s**). If **vo2usr** is not specified, then the user name comes from distinguished name in the certificate (i.e. text after **/CN=**) with spaces turned into underscores and the **VO** name is not used. Specifying **vo2usr=\*** returns the user name as set by the **gsi** plug-in.

**Notes**

- 1) The **AuthZ** plug-in is called *after* the **VOMS** plug-in.
- 2) The **AuthzVO** plug-in is best used when **gsi** internal mapping is turned off. Normally, this requires that you also specify **'-gmapopt:10 -gmapto:0'** options.

**Example**

```
-gmapopt:10 -gmapto:0 -authzfun:libXrdAuthzVO.so \
-authzfunparms:valido=atlas,cms,vo2grp=us%s
```

The above example loads the **AuthzVO** plug-in. The parameters indicate that only **VO** names of **atlas** and **cms** are valid. The **cms** **VO** name will be converted to a group name of **uscms** and **atlas** **VO** will be converted to a group name of **usatlas**. The user name comes from the distinguished name in the certificate.

2.5.1.1.1 Implementing an **authz** plug-in

The plug-in consists of three external functions loaded from the shared library specified by the **authzfun** option. In addition to the main function, the plug-in should contain a function defining the string to be used to key the result of the call, and a function to initialize the plug-in. The three functions must all be declared as **'extern "C"**.

The initialization function, **XrdSecgsiAuthzInit()**, is called once at start-up. Then for each authentication, the **XrdSecgsiAuthzKey()** function is called first and if successful **XrdSecgsiAuthzFun()** is called to augment the **XrdSecEntity** object.

The initialization function has name and signature

```
int XrdSecgsiAuthzInit(const char *parms)
```

where *parms* is a string that was specified using the **authzparms** option.

This function should return <0 in case of failure or the positive format type of the proxy chain expected by the main function:

- 0 raw, to be used with **XrdCrypto** tools
- 1 **PEM** base64 standard string

The key function has name and signature:

```
int XrdSecgsiAuthzKey(XrdSecEntity &entity, char **key)
```

**entity** is the **XrdSecEntity** as will be passed to **XrdSecgsiAuthzFun()**. The function is should fill in *\*key* with the key used to cache the result of the **XrdSecgsiAuthzFun()** function and should return the length of the key. The key is destroyed with **delete []**, so it must be allocated internally with **new char[]**.

The main function has the following signature and name:

```
int XrdSecgsiAuthzFun(XrdSecEntity &entity)
```

**entity** is the **XrdSecEntity** object associated with the handshake on the server side.

On input **entity** contains:

- **name** holds the username, DN or DN hash according to the **-gmapopt** option;
- **host** holds the client hostname;
- **creds** or **endorsements** hold the proxy chain, as specified by the **-putpxy** option. The proxy chain can be either in *raw opaque* or *PEM base64* format (see **XrdSecgsiAuthzInit()**).

This function should return

- 0 on success
- <0 on error (implies authentication failure)

### 2.5.1.2 The **gmap** plug-in

The **GSI** package does not come with an external **-gmapfun** plug-in. Instead, it uses an internal DN to username mapping function using a grid map file. The mapping parameters are specified by **-gmapopt** and **-gridmap** options. This is sufficient for simple sites with few users. More complicated sites should either implement their own **gmap** plug-in or use a **Virtual Organization Management System (VOMS)** and use the provided **VOMS** plug-in.

#### 2.5.1.2.1 Implementing a **gmap** plug-in

This function can be used to integrate or replace the grid-map file. The function is loaded as a plug-in from the shared library specified by the **-gmapfun** option. It must be declared as **extern "C"** and must have the following name and signature

```
extern "C" {
char *XrdSecgsiGMAPFun(const char *DN, int now)
{
    // DN is the user DN
    // now is the result of time(0)
    ...
    char *name = new char[length];
    ...
    return name;
}}
```

The function is called once after loading with the parameters defined by the **gmapfunparms** in the first argument (any 'useglobals' is removed; see below) and *now = 0* for initialization. Each parameter is separated by a vertical bar ('|').

Subsequent calls pass the distinguished name and the function should return the name to be used in an allocated **new char[]** array. Returning a nil pointer indicates failure.

Working examples can be found in the source distribution in files

**XrdSecgsiGMAPFunDN.cc** and **XrdSecgsiGMAPFunLDAP.cc**

under **src/XrdSecgsi**.

### 2.5.1.3 The voms plug-in

A general-purpose multi-vo **VOMS** extraction plug-in is part of the **gsi** package. It is implemented in the **libXrdVoms.so** shared library. *Be aware* that to use this plug-in the **libvomsapi.so** shared library must be installed. This is a generally available **RPM** from **EPEL** (for Linux see [pkgs.org](http://pkgs.org)). The parameters are as follows:

```
-vomsfunparms: [option[|option[|option[...]]]
option:      [dbg] [grpopt={usefirst | uselast | useall}]
             [grps=gname[,gname[,...]] [vos=vname[,vname[,...]]]
             [gsiopts]
gsiopts:    certfmt={pem | raw}
```

where:

**dbg** Prints additional information involved in the mapping and should only be used for debugging purposes.

#### certfmt

Specifies how the certificate should be passed to the plug-in. This option is only relevant to the **gsi** plug-in. One of two formats may be specified:

**pem** the certificate is to be passed as a base64 standard string.

**raw** the certificate is to be passed as a binary string to be used with the **XrdCrypto** tools.

#### grpopt

grpopt specifies how to handle multiple group membership. Acceptable groups may be restricted using the **grps** option. Otherwise, any group is considered acceptable. Specify one of:

**usefirst** only the first acceptable group is used.

**uselast** only the last acceptable group is used.

**useall** all acceptable groups are used (the default).

**grps** each *gname* specifies an acceptable group name. Only these group names are passed to the authorization framework. At least one listed group must be found in a **voms** extension for the plug-in to return success. If the **grps** option is not specified, all groups are accepted and the lack of any group presence does not cause failure.

**vos** each *vname* specifies an acceptable **Virtual Organization** name. Only these **VO** names are passed to the authorization framework. If the **vos** option is not specified, then all virtual organization names are accepted. At least one acceptable **VO** name must exist for the plug-in to return success.

### Defaults

See description of each single option.

### Notes

- 1) The **gsi** framework **voms** plug-in can be loaded by the **gsi** authentication plug-in using the **-vomsfun** option or by **http** plug-in using the **http.secextractor** configuration directive.
- 2) The **http** plug-in uses **https** protocol to obtain client certificates for authentication. The **https** protocol uses **x509** certificate format which is automatically accepted by the **voms** plug-in.
- 3) The **gsi** plug-in represents client certificates in raw binary format but is capable of converting them to **PEM** format. The **certfmt** option allows you to specify which format to use with the **voms** plug-in when using the plug-in with **gsi**. Usually, the default is sufficient.
- 4) In the unlikely event that the **XrdCrypto** package is not installed, the plug-in automatically requests a **PEM** format certificate.
- 5) For backward compatibility, the **VOMS** plug-in accepts the arcane, now deprecated, version of the **grpopt**:
 

**grpopt= select\*10+which**

<i>select</i>	is <b>0</b> (use all groups that are present, the default) or <b>1</b> (consider only those specified in the <b>grps</b> option).
<i>which</i>	is <b>0</b> (use the <i>first</i> acceptable one), <b>1</b> (use the <i>last</i> acceptable one), or <b>2</b> (use all of the relevant groups, the default).

### 2.5.1.3.1 Implementing a **voms** plug-in

This function can be used to fill the **VOMS**-related content of the **XrdSecEntity** structure for authorization purposes. The function is part of a set of two functions loaded from the file specified by the **-vomsfun** option. In addition to the main function, the plug-in should contain a function to initialize the plug-in. The two functions must all be declared as **'extern "C"**.

The initialization function has name and signature

```
int XrdSecgsiVOMSInit(const char *parms)
```

where *parms* is a string that was specified using the **-vomsparms** option. This function should return <0 in case of failure or the positive format type of the proxy chain expected by the main function:

- 0 raw, to be used with **XrdCrypto** tools
- 1 **PEM** base64 standard string

The main function has the following signature and name:

```
int XrdSecgsiVOMSFun(XrdSecEntity &entity)
```

where *entity* is the **XrdSecEntity** object associated with the handshake on the server side. On input *entity* contains:

- in *name* the username, DN or DN hash according to the GMAP option;
- in *host* the client hostname;
- in *creds* the proxy chain .

The proxy chain can be either in *raw opaque* or *PEM base64* format as requested by the **XrdSecgsiVOMSInit()** function.

This function returns

- 0 on success
- <0 on error (implies authentication failure)

A working example can be found in the source distribution in the file **XrdSecgsiVOMSFunLite.cc** under **src/XrdSecgsi** .

## 2.5.1.4 Configuring GSI Security

### 2.5.1.4.1 Server side

Follow these steps to configure **GSI** protocol for **xrootd**:

1. Locate a valid certificate to be used by the server. This should be a host certificate with a valid SAN extension that specifies the fully qualified hostname. You can check if the certificate has a valid SAN extension with  
`openssl x509 -text -in cert-pem-file | grep DNS:`
2. Locate the directory path with the certificates for the trusted CAs. File names holding **CA** certificates are of the type `<subject_hash>.0`; for example, for the **CERN CA**, the certificate file is `"1d879c6c.0"`.
3. If strong requirements about the **CRLs** have to be applied, locate the **CRL** certificate files; these are usually located in the same directory as the **CA** certificates, have the same name but extension `".r0"`; for the example above, the **CRL** file is `"1d879c6c.r0"`.
4. If some non-default values are found at points 1-3, add the relevant parameters in the **sec.protocol** directive of the configuration file.

#### 2.5.1.4.2 Client side

The default settings should be adequate for most of the use cases. Exceptions to the rule may be the location of the CA certificates and related CRLs, and the strength of the requirement about CRLs.

The following **environment variables** are provided to change the defaults on the client side:

##### **XrdSecDEBUG**

verbose level; the level can be set to 1 (low), 2 (medium) or 3 (high or dump)  
Default is 0.

##### **XrdSecGSIUSERCERT** or **X509\_USER\_CERT**

alternative full path to the file containing the certificate to be used by the client; the path can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; '~/' is expanded to \$HOME. Default: **\$HOME/.globus/usercert.pem**

##### **XrdSecGSIUSERKEY** or **X509\_USER\_KEY**

alternative full path to the file containing the private key associated with client certificate; the path can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; '~/' is expanded to \$HOME. Default: **\$HOME/.globus/userkey.pem**

##### **XrdSecGSIUSERPROXY** or **X509\_USER\_PROXY**

alternative full path to the file containing the user proxy certificate to be used by the client; the path can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; '~/' is expanded to \$HOME. Default **/tmp/x509up\_uuid**

##### **XrdSecGSIPROXYVALID**

validity of the proxy certificate; *formst* is in the form "hh:mm". Default is "12:00", i.e. 12 hours.

##### **XrdSecGSIPROXYKEYBITS**

bit strength of the proxy **PKI**. Default is **512**.

##### **XrdSecGSIPROXYDEPLEN**

number of children generations which can originate from this proxy and controls delegation extent. Use -1 for infinite. Default is 0.

**XrdSecGSICADIR** or **X509\_CERT\_DIR**

alternative full path to the directory containing the **CA** certificates; the path can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; '~/' is expanded to \$HOME. Default: **/etc/grid-security/certificates**

**XrdSecGSICRLDIR** or **X509\_CERT\_DIR**

alternative full path to the directory containing the files with **CRL** information for **CAs**; the path can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; '~/' is expanded to \$HOME. Default: **/etc/grid-security/certificates**

**XrdSecGSICACHECK** (defines **CA** verification level):

- 0 do not verify;
  - 1 verify if self-signed, issuing a warning if not;
  - 2 always verify the **CAs** in the chain, failing if not possible.
- Default is **1**.

**XrdSecGSICRLCHECK** (type of check to be performed on **CRLs**):

- 0 do not care; ignore any **CRL** information for the **CA** being used for certificate chain verification;
  - 1 use **CRL** if available (if the **CRL** certificate is missing for a given **CA**, the related **CRL** is assumed to be empty);
  - 2 *require* **CRL** for any trusted **CA**, but do not stop if the **CRL** certificate is not up-to-date;
  - 12 *require* **CRL** for any trusted **CA**, and attempt to download the **CRL** certificate if the file is not found or is not up-to-date;
  - 3 *require* an *up-to-date* **CRL** for each **CA**;
- Default is **1**.

**XrdSecGSICRLDIR**

alternative full path to the directory containing the **CRL** certificates; the path can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; '~/' is expanded to \$HOME. Default is the *same as for CA certificates*.

**XrdSecGSICRLEXT**

alternative default extension for **CRL** certificate files. Default is **".r0"**.

**XrdSecGSIDELEGPROXY** (defines behavior with respect to proxy delegation):

- 0 do nothing (i.e. delegation is disabled).
- 1 sign the proxy certificate supplied by the server to enable delegation.
- 2 send the local proxy certificate to the server (this includes proxy private key).

Default is 0.

**XrdSecGSISRVRNAMES**

Define valid CNs for the server certificates; default is null, which means that the server CN must be in the form `"*/<hostname>"`. The string may contain multiple format specifications separated by a '|'. Each specifications can contain the `<host>` or `<fqdn>` placeholders which are replaced by `XrdSecEntity.host`; they can also contain the '\*' wildcard. A '-' before the specification will deny the matching CN's; the last matching wins.

**XrdSecGSITRUSTDNS** (controls hostname validation):

- 0 do not use **DNS** to aide in certificate hostname validation.
- 1 use **DNS**, if needed, to validate certificate hostnames.

Default is 0.



### 2.5.1.5 xrdgsiproxy

```
xrdgsiproxy [mode] [-bits bits] [-cert file]
             [-certdir dir] [-debug] [-f file] [-key file]
             [-out file] [-path-length len] [-valid valid]
```

#### Function

Stand-alone application to browse, create or destroy a user proxy certificate.

#### Parameters

*mode* Specifies the operation mode:

*info* display content of the proxy certificate;

*init* create a proxy certificate;

*destroy* destroy existing proxy certificate.

Default is *info*.

#### **bits** *bits*

Bit strength of the proxy PKI. Default is **512**.

#### **certdir** *dir*

Alternate directory path for trusted Certificate Authority certificates. Default:  
**/etc/grid-security/certificates**

#### **cert** *file*

Alternate path for the user certificate file.

Default: **\$HOME/.globus/usercert.pem**

#### **debug**

Run in verbose mode.

#### **f** *file*, **out** *file*

Alternate location of the proxy file. Default: **/tmp/x509up\_uuid**

#### **key** *file*

Alternate path for the file containing the private key associated with the user certificate. Default: **\$HOME/.globus/userkey.pem**

**path-length** *len*

Number of child generations which can originate from this proxy (i.e., control delegation). Use -1 for infinite. Default is **0**.

**valid** *valid*

Validity of the proxy certificate. Default is **12:00**, i.e. 12 hours.

## 2.5.2 host protocol

```
sec.protocol host
```

### Function

Enable host protocol to be used.

### Defaults

Even though the host protocol is built-in; it will not be used unless specified with a **protocol** directive.

### Notes

- 1) Because **host** protocol is the least restrictive authentication mechanism; allowing its unbound use (see the **protbind** directive) makes all other protocols superfluous. A warning message is issued if you define the host protocol but do not restrict its use to certain hosts.
- 2) **Warning:** **host** protocol does not provide any significant level of security and should only be used in instances where security violations do not matter.

### Example

```
sec.protocol host
```



### 2.5.3 krb5 protocol

```
sec.protocol [ libpath ] krb5 [ kfn ] [ -ipchk ] sid
```

#### Function

Define the characteristics of the **krb5** authentication protocol.

#### Parameters

##### *libpath*

The absolute directory path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader or the **LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH** environmental variable.

*kfn* The full pathname to the file that contains encryption and decryption keys for the protocol. The default **keyfile** name is protocol dependent.

##### **-ipchk**

Verifies that credentials are always presented from the same host that actually obtained the credentials.

*sid* The service principal name used for authentication.

#### Defaults

The key file location is defined by Kerberos V to be `/etc/v5srvtab`. IP checking is disabled (i.e., the host that obtained credentials need not be the same as the one that supplies the credentials).

#### Notes

- 1) The **noipcheck** option is provided for **AFS** Kerberos support (i.e., you must specify **noipcheck** when using **AFS** kerberos) as well as support for installations that wish to forward tickets from host to host.

#### Example

```
sec.protocol krb5 /etc/krb5keys xrdserv
```

### 2.5.3.1 Configuring Kerberos V Security

Follow these steps to configure Kerberos V protocol for **xrootd**:

1. Create a principal in the Kerberos authentication database. This principal will be the **xrootd** "service name". While the default is to create a different instance<sup>1</sup> of the principal for every machine on which **xrootd** runs, it is much easier to create a single instance for all machines, especially if you have many machines.
2. Install a keytab file containing the principal's key string. The keytab file may be generated by using **kadmin**<sup>2</sup> command in Unix and the **Ktpass** command in Windows, as follows:

Unix:

```
kadmin  
ktadd -k filename principal
```

Windows:

```
Ktpass -princ principal -pass pswd -out filename
```

Substitute for *filename* the name of the keytab file you wish to create or the name of an existing keytab file to which you wish to add a key. For *principal*, substitute the name of the principal you created in the previous step. Consult the man pages on **kadmin** and **Ktpass** for more information.

1. Place the **srvtab** file in a secure location on each server.
2. In the **xrootd** configuration file code the protocol directive using the location of the **srvtab** file and the service name principal, as previously described.
3. If you are using Kerberos V with **AFS**, make sure to *not* specify the **-ipchk** protocol directive option since **AFS** does not handle ticket **IP** addresses.

---

<sup>1</sup> Kerberos V service principals are of the form "name/hostname".

<sup>2</sup> The command requires the "inquire" administrative privilege.

## 2.5.4 `pwd` protocol

```
sec.protocol [ libpath ] pwd [-d:level] [-dir:dir]  
[-vc:level] [-syspwd] [-maxfail:num]  
[-lf:lifetime] [-a:option] [-c:list]  
[-upwd:option] [-udir:dir]  
[-cryptfile:file]
```

### Function

Define the characteristics of the `pwd` authentication protocol.

### Parameters

#### *libpath*

The absolute directory path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader or the `LD_LIBRARY_PATH` environmental variable.

#### *d:level*

Sets the verbosity level for this module to *level*; the level can be set to 1 (low), 2 (medium) or 3 (high or dump). Invoking `xrootd` with the verbose option `-d` sets the internal verbosity for this module to 1. Default is 0.

#### *dir:dir*

Specifies the directory path where to look for the password file; if this directive is missing, the password file is searched for under `$HOME/.xrd`; the alternative directory path can be either absolute (begins with `/`), relative to `$HOME` (begins with `~`), or relative to directory where the daemon is started.

Examples:

```
-dir:/etc/xrd
```

make use of `/etc/xrd/pwdadmin` as password file

```
-dir:~/local/xrd
```

make use of `$HOME/local/xrd/pwdadmin` as password file

```
-dir:xrd
```

make use of `$PWD/xrd/pwdadmin` as password file

**vc:level**

Specifies the level of verification of client identity:

- 0 no additional check is done; the exchanged information packet could potentially be re-used for a reply attack.
- 1 verify timestamp signature; this limits the time window for reply attacks to 5 min.
- 2 verify random nonce signature; this choice eliminates the risk of reply attacks; it requires an additional exchange.

Default is 2.

**syspwd**

Instructs the server to check also the system password file; the right privileges must be owned by the server to be able to do this operation.

**maxfail:num**

Specifies the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts allowed before the related user tag is blocked. Option *disabled* by default.

**If:lifetime**

Specifies the lifetime of the current password; when a time interval longer than this value is elapsed from the last the password change, the user is asked to change its password at next login. The format is

“<years>y:<days>d:<hours>h:<minutes>m:<seconds>s”

e.g. “1y:182d:12h” for one year and a half. Lifetime is *infinite* by default.

**a:option**

Specify the set of users allowed to auto-register. Possible choices

- 0 none
- 1 users with an account on the machine (according to `getpwnam`) or with an enabled entry in the password file;
- 2 everybody.

Default is 0.

**c:list**

Specifies the list of supported cryptographic modules; the default is 'ssl|local', with 'ssl' indicating the module based on OpenSSL, and 'local' an implementation of cipher-related functionality written by A. Pukall (<http://membres.lycos.fr/pc1/>) and provided for backup in the case OpenSSL is not available.

**upwd:option**

Specify whether the server should also consider password files provided by users having an account on the server node; possible choices:

- 0 ignore user password files
- 1 use user password file \$USERHOME/.xrd/pwduser, where \$USERHOME is the user home directory as returned by getpwnam; the default subdirectory .xrd can be changed with `-udir` (see below).
- 2 check also password files with crypt-like password hashes; the default name for the file is \$USERHOME/.xrdpass and can be changed with `-cryptfile` (see below). This option is provided mostly for backward compatibility with ROOT daemons.

Default is 0.

**udir:dir**

Specify alternative user sub-directory for the user password file; if existing, the file read is "\$HOMEUSER/*dir*/pwduser". Default: **.xrd**.

**cryptfile:file**

Specify alternative name for file with crypt-like password hash when option `-upwd:2` has been specified. Default: **.xrdpass**

**Defaults**

See description of each single parameter.

**Example**

```
sec.protocol pwd -a:1
```

## 2.5.4.1 Configuring pwd Security

### 2.5.4.1.1 Server side

Follow these steps to configure the password-based protocol for **xrootd**:

1. Create a password file. To create the file in the default location ( $\$HOME/.xrd/pwdadmin$ ) just run **xrdpwdadmin** (see below). Add a contact e-mail and the host name with

```
xrdpwdadmin add -host FQDN -email e.mail@my.domain
```

2. Add entries for the users, e.g.

```
xrdpwdadmin add usertag
```

The file  $\$HOME/.xrd/genpwd/usertag$  is created: it contains information about the temporary password and the public cipher initiators of the server. This file should be sent in a secure way to the user for which *usertag* has been created.

3. Users with an account on the system may be allowed by the server administrator to define their own password file, a sort of auto-registration. Option `'-upwd:1'` enables this feature. A user-password file (default coordinates  $\$HOME/.xrd/pwduser$ ) can be created in the same way as the main password file, changing the mode with `'-m user'`; only entries tagged with the file owner username are processed.

### 2.5.4.1.2 Client side

There are two files relevant for the client: the auto-login file (default  $\$HOME/.xrd/pwdnetrc$ ) and the file with the server cipher public initiators (default  $\$HOME/.xrd/pwdsrvpuk$ ). These files are created automatically by the code initializing the client. However, the user can browse and modify them with **xrdpwdadmin**. In particular, when the client receives the file *pwdfile* with password and cipher information, it can import the content as follows

```
xrdpwdadmin -m srvpuk -import pwdfile  
xrdpwdadmin -m netrc update -import pwdfile
```

By default **auto-login** is switched-off. It can be switched using the appropriate environment variable (see below). The auto-login system understands any '\*' as a wild character. A valid entry applying to a set of host of similar name can be copied into an entry with a wild char using *copy*; for example, after

```
xrdpwdadmin -m netrc copy usertag@lxplus076.cern.ch usertag@lxplus*
```

the password associated with *usertag@lxplus\** will be used for a first login attempt to any machine of the LXPLUS cluster (depending on the shell, the '\*' may need to be escaped in the above *copy* command).

Clients can require at any moment a password change by prefixing the password with the string \$changepwd\$, e.g. if the current password for usertag is curpwd, and the string "\$changepwd\$curpwd" is entered at password prompt, the client will be prompted again for the new password.

The following **environment variables** are provided to change the defaults on the client side:

XrdSecDEBUG	verbose level; the level can be set to 1 (low), 2 (medium) or 3 (high or dump). Default is <b>0</b> .
XrdSecPWDAUTOLOG	switch ON (=1) or OFF (=0) use of autologin information; default is <b>0</b> (OFF).
XrdSecPWDALOGFILE	full path to the file with autologin information. Default: <b>\$HOME/.xrd/pwdnetrc</b>
XrdSecPWDVERIFYSRV	switch ON (=1) or OFF (=0) verification of server identity; verification requires the signature of a random nonce, which implies an additional exchange. Default is <b>1</b> (ON).
XrdSecPWDSRVPUK	full path to the file with server cipher initiators. Default: <b>\$HOME/.xrd/pwdsrvpuk</b>



### 2.5.4.2 xrdpwdadmin

```
xrdpwdadmin [-m mode] action [tag] [newtag] [-f file]
            [-force] [-crypto list]
            [[-no]passwd] [[-no]random] [[-no]change]
            [-import file]
            [-host name] [-email mail]
            [-iternum num] [-changepwd]
```

#### Function

Stand-alone application to browse, create or modify password and auto-login files.

#### Parameters

*mode* specifies the operation mode:

**admin** manage a general password file (server side);

**user** manage user-specific password file (server side);

**netrc** manage an auto-login file (client side);

**srvpuk** manage a file with public cipher initiators (client side).

Default is **admin**.

*action* specifies the action to be performed on the file:

**add** add new entry; requires specification of *tag*

**update** update information about an entry; requires specification of *tag*

**remove** remove all information about a tag; requires specification of *tag*

**disable** disable logins for a given tag; requires specification of *tag*

**copy** create a new tag as exact copy of an existing tag; requires specification of *tag* and *newtag*

**browse** browse the content of the file

**trim** eliminate obsolete / not-reachable information after a remove

Default is **browse**.

*tag, newtag*

String of characters of any length identifying a set of entries in the password file.

*f file* specifies an alternative path for the file to manage/create.

**[no]passwd**

**[add, update only]** Controls whether a password should be assigned to the entry or not; by default a password is assigned; if *-nopasswd* is specified, the entry is just activated and, if auto-registration is allowed, the user will be asked to set a password the first time she logs in.

**[no]random**

**[add, update only]** Controls randomness of a password; by default the new password is a random string of 8 printable chars; if *-norandom* is specified, the caller is prompted for a password; in *update* mode, a check is done to ensure that the new password is different from the current one.

**[no]change**

**[add, update only]** Controls type of password; by default the new password is a *one-time only* password to be changed upon first use; if *-nochange* is specified, the password type is directly set to *normal*.

**import file**

**[netrc, srvpuk only]** Import information from the file received by the administrator of the password file.

**changepwd**

**[netrc only]** Set password status to *one-time-only* so that at next login a password change handshake is triggered.

**host hostname**

**[admin, user only]** Add a special entry with the host name to the password file.

**email e-mail**

**[admin, user only]** Add a special entry with a contact e-mail to the password file.

**iternum num**

**[admin, user only]** Number of iterations to be used in hashing within the key derivation function. This is the main factor limiting time performance. Default is 10000 (J. Viega, M. Messier, *Secure Programming Cookbook*, p. 141).

**crypto** *list*

List of cryptographic modules (separated by a vertical bar) to be used if available. Default is 'ssl|local'.

**force**

Forces execution of the requested action even if it modifies existing information. When used together with *add*, it is equivalent to *update*.



### 2.5.5 sss protocol

```

sec.protocol [ libpath ] sss [options]

options: [{-c | --clientkt} cktpath]
          [{-e | --encrypt} etype]
          [{-g | --getcreds}]
          [{-l | --lifetime} lifetime]
          [{-k | --keyname}]
          [{-p | --proxy} protmap]
          [{-r | --refresh} refresh]
          [{-s | --serverkt} sktpath]

```

#### Function

Define the characteristics of the simple shared secret (sss) authentication protocol.

#### Parameters

*libpath*

is the absolute directory path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader or the **LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH** environmental variable.

**{-c | --clientkt}** *cktpath*

is the absolute file-path to the client's key table. The key table file must only be readable by the username under which the client is running, or group readable if the file name ends with ".grp". This is provided as a hint to the client and may be over-ridden (see the notes).

**{-e | --encrypt}** *etype*

is the encryption type to be used when transmitting secret information. Valid types are:

**bf32** Blowfish encryption with CRC32 message validation (the default).

**{-g | --getcreds}**

retrieves the original credentials from the client, if applicable. See the notes on why you would want to specify this option.

**{-k | --keyname}**

uses the name of the key and key's identifier used by the client to find the key in the server's key table. The default is to only use the key identifier. See the notes on why this is the default and why you may want to specify this option.

**{-l | --lifetime}** *lifetime*

is the maximum lifetime of any encrypted message sent between the client and server. Messages older than the specified number of seconds are rejected. The default is 13 seconds.

**{-p | --proxy}** *protmap*

specifies the authentication protocols that the **sss** protocol may assume (i.e. proxy). Specify for *protmap* a colon separated list of protocol names. See the section on [proxy authentication](#) for more information. The default does not allow proxy authentication.

**{-r | --refresh}** *refresh*

is the key table file refresh interval. The server checks every *refresh* minutes if minimum *refresh* value is 10 minutes. The default is 60 minutes.

**{-s | --serverkt}** *sktpath*

is the absolute file-path to the server's key table. The key table file must only be readable by the username under which the server is running or group readable if the file name ends with ".grp". The default is "\$HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab".

**Defaults**

See description of each single parameter.

**Notes**

- 1) Default locations exist for client- and server-side key table files. This is "\$HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab". Use the **-c** option to over-ride the default for the client and the **-s** option to over-ride the default for the server. Note that the client may specify a fixed location for the key table file irrespective of any explicit or implicit default.
- 2) The **--lifetime** option controls how long an encrypted message may remain valid. This minimizes replay attacks. However, if server or client response times are slower than the lifetime of the message, the parties will not be able to authenticate. In this case, you should specify a larger time.

- 3) The **-getcreds** option requests that the client supply the original credentials that were issued for a previous authentication. This only applies to proxy servers who are acting on behalf of a client. Normally, credentials are not transmitted because they are unusable by a second party unless they have been delegated. However, should they be delegated, transmitting them to a third party may pose a security risk. You should not specify this option unless it is essential to do so. The client, nonetheless, is free to ignore this request.
- 4) The **-keyname** option qualifies the key lookup with the *keyname* used by the client. By default, lookups are done only by *keyid*. However, it is possible that the same *keyid* may appear under two different *keynames* should they be added to the key table on different hosts or very close together on the same host. The **-keyname** option addresses this problem. The reason that it is not the default is strictly for backward compatibility as many sites have solved this problem in ways that may be incompatible with a *keyname-keyid* lookup.
- 5) The **-getcreds** and **-keyname** options appeared in Release 5. Older clients do not support these options. Older clients never send credentials and the server always reverts to *keyid* lookups for older clients.
- 6) The **xrdsssadmin** command is used to create and maintain key tables that contain simple shared secrets. The command also is used to specify how shared secrets map to authenticated user and group names.
- 7) An “*sss*” authenticated client can set its identity using an instance of an object in the **XrdSecsssID** class. See the comments in **XrdSecsssID.hh** source file for detailed information.

### Example

```
sec.protocol sss -r 30 -s /opt/xrootd/.xrd/sss.keytab
```

### 2.5.5.1 Proxy Authentication

The Release 5 version of the **sss** protocol is capable of proxying any credential that may have been issued to a client. For instance, assume client **A** authenticates to server **X** using **gsi** protocol then server **X** authenticates with server **Y** using **sss** it may do so using client **A**'s credentials. The **sss** protocol, if allowed, recreates the authentication context on server **Y** so that it appears that the server is actually communicating with client **A**.

Since proxying security protocol identities comes with its own set of risks, it must be explicitly enabled as follows:

- a) The original protocol used by the client must appear in the list of allowable protocols specified by the **-authmap** option,
- b) The username assigned to the key used to encrypt communications must be **"allusers"**. This allows you to selectively restrict proxying by key; and
- c) The client must supply a username and its original trace identity.

Original credentials, if requested by the server (i.e. **-getcreds** option), are honored by the client only if mutual authentication occurs and the key being used is assigned the username **"allusers"**.

When proxying is not possible, the server reverts to identifying the protocol used as **sss** and applies the key restrictions to the formulated identity. Otherwise, the protocol is identified as the original one used by the client.

## 2.5.5.2 Configuring sss Security

### 2.5.5.2.1 Server side

For very simple<sup>3</sup> installations, follow these steps to configure the **sss** protocol for **xrootd**:

1. Create a key table file. To create the file in the default location (`$HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab`) just run **xrdsssadmin** (see below<sup>4</sup>) under the *same* username that will be used for **xrootd**:

```
xrdsssadmin add
```

2. Distribute the key table file to the hosts that need to share the secret in the key table file. You can use a combination of **ssh** and **xrdsssadmin** to securely do this. For example, executing the following under the *same* username that will be used for **xrootd**

```
cat $HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab | ssh user@host xrdsssadmin install
```

where *user* is the username that will be used to run the client application on node *host*. This will create the file `$HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab` on the machine named *host* only readable by *user*.

### 2.5.5.2.2 Client side

The only file that the client needs is the key table file. This should have been distributed using the procedure outlined in the previous section. Two environmental variables control client-side execution:

**XrdSecDEBUG**      debug level; the level can be set to 1 (on). Default is 0.

**XrdSecSSSKT**      holds the location of the key table file. When set, the key table *must* exist as specified in the environmental variable. When not set, the default is provided by the server initiating the authentication protocol. If the server does not provide a default or if the key table is not found there, `$HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab` becomes the default.

---

<sup>3</sup> For more complicated installations refer to the **xrdsssadmin** command.

<sup>4</sup> For more complicated installations, see the description of the **xrdsssadmin** command.



### 2.5.5.3 xrdsssadmin

```
xrdsssadmin [options] action [ keyfn[.grp] ]

action:      add | del | install | list

options:    [-d] [-g group] [-h hold] [-k keyname[+]]
              [-l keylen] [-n keynum] [-s {c|g|k|n|u|x}]
              [-u user] [-x {days | mm/dd/yy} ]
```

#### Function

Stand-alone application to browse, create or modify the key table for the **sss** protocol.

#### Parameters

*keyfn*[**.grp**]

is the name of the key table file which is the target of the *action*. If the name ends with **.grp** then the file is allowed to have group access read-mode bits set. Otherwise, the file may only be read and written by the owner. If *keyfn* is not specified, `$HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab` is used. See the notes for details.

- add** adds a new key to the key table. The new key may be assigned an optional *keyname*, *group*, and *user*; with defaults of **anywhere**, **nogroup**, and **nobody**, respectively.
- del** deletes an existing key from the key table. Only keys matching **-g**, **-k**, **-n**, and **-u** options, as specified, are deleted.
- install** creates or replaces an existing key table. Only keys matching **-g**, **-k**, **-n**, and **-u** options, as specified, are installed. The key table is read from standard in; making the command suitable for use with **ssh** to provide a secure in-place update of a key table on a remote host.
- list** displays the contents of the key table. Only keys matching **-g**, **-k**, **-n**, and **-u** options, as specified, are displayed.

**-d** turns on debugging output.

**-g** *group*

specifies an optional group name. The resulting effect is dependent on the *action*. See the notes for a detailed explanation.

**-h** *hold* is the maximum number of keys with the same *keyname* that are to be held in the key table file. The default *hold* value is 3. See the notes for more information.

**-k** *keyname*[+]

specifies an optional key name. The resulting effect is dependent on the *action*. If the *keyname* ends with a plus sign (+), *sss* tokens may be forwarded when encrypted by the associated key. *Warning: forward-able sss tokens are inherently less secure.* See the notes for a detailed explanation.

**-l** *keylen*

is the byte-length of key to be added to the key table file via the **add** action. The default key length is 32 bytes (i.e., 256 bits). The *keylen* value should be between 4 and 128, inclusive. Otherwise, it is set to the minimum (maximum) value, as appropriate.

**-n** *keynum*

specifies an optional key number. The resulting effect is dependent on the *action*. See the notes for a detailed explanation.

**-s** {**c** | **g** | **k** | **n** | **u** | **x**}

sorts the output of the **list** action in ascending order as follows:

<b>c</b> - by creation date	<b>k</b> - by key name	<b>u</b> - by user name
<b>g</b> - by group name	<b>n</b> - by key number	<b>x</b> - by expiration date

**-u** *user* specifies an optional user name. The resulting effect is dependent on the *action*. See the notes for a detailed explanation.

**-x** *days* is the number of days that the key is to be valid. Specifying 0, the default, will never expire the key.

**-x** *mm/dd/yy*

is the date at which the key is to expire.

**Notes**

- 1) The **-g**, **-k**, **-n** and **-u** options modify the effects of the specified action. For **del**, **install**, and **list** actions, these options are used to narrow the set of keys to which the action applies. That is, only keys matching the specified options are deleted, installed, or listed.
- 2) For the **add** action, the **-g**, **-k**, and **-u** options are used to associated a group name, key name, and user name with the key. The following table lists the default names and special names.

Option	Default Name	Special Names
<b>-g</b>	nogroup	anygroup, usrgroup
<b>-u</b>	nobody	anybody, allusers

**anygroup**

allows the client using the key to specify<sup>5</sup> the actual group name. If the client omits the specification, the default name is used.

**usrgroup**

always sets the group list to null. This defers setting the user's groups until authorization time<sup>6</sup>.

**anybody**

allows the client using the key to specify<sup>7</sup> the actual user name. If the client omits the specification, the default name is used.

**allusers**

allows the original security protocol used by the client to be proxied by the server. Special group names are ignored if proxying the user's identity is successful. See the section on [proxy authentication](#).

- 3) Specifying any name other than a special name, prohibits the client from over-riding the name. The authenticated name is set to the specified name when the client successfully uses the associated key.
- 4) **Warning:** using special names *require* that you trust the client to specify a proper name. Special names do not confer any additional security.

<sup>5</sup> The client does this as specified in the **XrdSecsssID.hh** file.

<sup>6</sup> The default authorization described in this reference uses the "userid" to look-up the associated groups as defined by Unix.

<sup>7</sup> The client does this as specified in the **XrdSecsssID.hh** file.

- 5) When the *keyname* ends with a plus sign, an **sss** token encrypted by the associated key may be forwarded (i.e. used by a host different from the one that encrypted the **sss** token). **Warning:** *Allowing forwarded tokens makes it impossible to detect man-in-the-middle attacks or stolen sss tokens.* To maintain a high level of security, you should avoid making **sss** tokens forward-able whenever possible.
- 6) You need to make **sss** tokens forward-able for certain clients. For instance, clients who reside on a private network and tunnel through a Network Address Translation (NAT) device cannot use non-forward-able **sss** tokens. This is because the NAT device appears as a man-in-the-middle attacker to the **sss** protocol and the client's **sss** token will be rejected. Forward-able **sss** tokens avoid this problem.
- 7) For simple installations, you need not assign keys names. For more secure installations, you can use the *keyname* to easily install designated keys on designated hosts; limiting your exposure to intrusions. For instance,

```
xrdsssadmin -k io.slac.stanford.edu add /opt/xrootd/mytab
xrdsssadmin -k foo.harvard.edu add /opt/xrootd/mytab
```

adds two keys to file **/opt/xrootd/mytab**, each with a unique name that corresponds to the host that should receive that key. You can now easily distribute the desired keys to each host by executing one of the following

```
grep io.slac.stanford.edu /opt/xrootd/mytab \
| ssh ul@io.slac.stanford.edu \
xrdsssadmin install /opt/xrootd/mytab
```

```
egrep 'foo.harvard.edu|io.slac.stanford.edu' /opt/xrootd/mytab \
| ssh ul@border.slac.stanford.edu \
xrdsssadmin install /opt/xrootd/mytab
```

## 2.5.6 unix protocol

```
sec.protocol [ libpath ] unix
```

### Function

Define the characteristics of the **unix** authentication protocol.

### Parameters

*libpath*

The absolute directory path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader or the **LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH** environmental variable.

### Defaults

None.

### Notes

- 1) **Warning:** **unix** protocol does not provide any significant level of security and should only be used in instances where security violations do not matter.

### Example

```
sec.protocol /usr/lib/xrd unix
```



### 2.5.7 ztn protocol

```

sec.protocol [ libpath ] ztn [ options ]

options: [-expiry {ignore | optional | require}

          [-maxsz toksz[k]] [-tokenlib tlpath]

```

#### Function

Define the characteristics of the **ztn** client validation protocol.

#### Parameters

##### *libpath*

The absolute directory path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader or the **LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH** environmental variable.

##### **-expiry**

Specifies how token expiration is to be handled should the expiry check *not* be applied by the token validation library. Specify one of

- ignore** - token expiration should be ignored (*not recommended*).
- optional** - if the token specifies an expiration time it must not have passed.
- require** - the token must specify an expiration time and it must not have passed. This is the default.

##### **-maxsz**

The maximum size of a valid bearer token. Specify for *toksz* the size in bytes or kilobytes if suffixed by the letter **k**. The maximum allowable size is 512k. The default is **4k**.

*tlpath* The absolute path bearer token authorization shared library. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader or the **LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH** environmental variable. The default is **libXrdAccSciTokens.so**.

#### Defaults

```
-expiry required -maxsz 4k -tokenlib libXrdAccSciTokens.so
```

## Notes

- 1) The **ztn** client validation protocol is primarily meant verify that a connecting client is capable of getting a valid unexpired bearer token from a recognized token issuer. Clients that cannot show such proof are rejected. This effectively screens out bad actors that try to anonymously probe the server's capabilities.
- 2) The **ztn** client validation protocol requires that all communications occur over a **TLS** connection. When enabled the server automatically requires that logins and all subsequent requests use **TLS**. This is enforced irrespective of any other enabled authentication protocol even if such protocols do not require **TLS**.
- 3) The **ztn** protocol records the token's subject value as the name of the incoming client. If the subject is missing (which normally results in authorization failure), the client's name becomes "**anon**".
- 4) The **-expiry none** option is only used should the expiry check in the token library not be applied. Normally, all tokens are required to have an expiration time.
- 5) The **ztn** protocol returns failure if the corresponding token authorization plug-in has not been enabled using the **ofs.authlib** directive.
- 6) See the [following section](#) on details of the token discovery mechanism.

## Example

```
sec.protocol ztn -maxsz 8k
```

### 2.5.7.1 Default token discovery mechanism and augmentation

When the server requests **ztn** to be applied and the default mechanism is not disabled the following actions occur either before or after augmentation.

1. If the **BEARER\_TOKEN** environment variable is set, then the value is taken to be the token contents.
2. If the **BEARER\_TOKEN\_FILE** environment variable is set, then its value is interpreted as a filename. If the file exists, the contents of the specified file are taken to be the token contents.
3. If the **XDG\_RUNTIME\_DIR** environment variable is set, then take the token from the contents of **\$XDG\_RUNTIME\_DIR/bt\_*uuid*** (where *uuid* is the user's effective **uid**). If the file exists, the contents of the file are taken to be the token contents.
4. Otherwise, if the file **/tmp/bt\_*uuid*** (where *uuid* is the user's effective **uid**) exists, the contents of the file are taken to be the token contents.
5. The token is deemed to not exist and unless there is post augmentation, **ztn** validation fails.

In all cases the following *processing* rules also apply:

1. When a non-null token value is found, all whitespace on the left and right sides of the value are stripped (whitespace is defined the same way as the **C99 isspace()** function defines whitespace).
2. If after stripping the whitespace the result is null, the token is deemed to not exist and the search for the token continues with the next step.
3. If after stripping the whitespace a value remains, it is taken as the token even if it is invalid. This token value is used and all subsequent steps are ignored. Since the **ztn** protocol generates a server-side error when an invalid token is processed and is reflected to the client, this arrangement still conforms to **RFC6750**.

In addition to the above, the client's **ztn** protocol verifies that the file containing the token is only readable and writable by the owner of the file. If this check fails, the token is not returned.



## 2.6 protparm

```
sec.protparm pid parms
```

### Function

Specify protocol parameters.

### Parameters

*pid* The identifier of a yet-to-be-defined protocol with the **protocol** directive.

*parms* The parameters required by the protocol to operate successfully. The parameters are protocol dependent.

### Defaults

See each protocol for its specific set of default parameters.

### Notes

- 1) The **protparm** directive allows you to conveniently specify very long parameter strings. The final parameters are constructed in the order specified; with each specification (i.e., *parms*) separated by a new-line (\n) character. The first parameter string comes from the *parms* specification on the **protocol** directive.
- 2) The specified *pid* must not have been yet defined using the protocol directive.
- 3) Each specified *pid* must have a matching **protocol** directive following the last occurrence of **protparm** *pid*.

### Example

```
sec.protparm krb5 /etc/krb5keys xrdserv
```



## 3 Default Authorization Configuration

### 3.1 audit

```
acc.audit parm [ parm ]  
  
parm:    deny | grant | none
```

#### Function

Control the level of auditing.

#### Parameters

*parm* The level of auditing specify one or more of:

- deny** - audit access denials
- grant** - audit access approvals
- none** - turn off auditing

#### Defaults

```
acc.audit none
```

#### Notes

- 1) Audit parameters are cumulative. To enabled auditing of denials and approvals you must specify both **deny** and **grant** parameters.
- 2) The **none** parameter turns off auditing regardless of what was specified prior to the **none** parameter.
- 3) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

#### Example

```
acc.audit deny
```

## 3.2 authdb

```
acc.authdb path
```

### Function

Specify the location of the authorization database.

### Parameters

*path* The absolute path of the authorization database.

### Defaults

```
acc.authdb /opt/xrd/etc/Authfile
```

### Notes

- 1) You *must* specify the **authdb** directive together with the **ofs.authorize** directive in order to enable authorization.
- 2) The meaning of the specification depends on the mechanism used to obtain authorization information. The default implementation uses a flat file. You specify the name of this flat file using the **authdb** directive.
- 3) In order to maintain proper security, the authorization file must only be writable by the user running as **xrootd**. Some installation may also wish to restrict read access to the same user.
- 4) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

### Example

```
acc.authdb /opt/xrd/etc/AuthDB
```

### 3.3 authrefresh

```
acc.authrefresh seconds
```

#### Function

Control how frequently the authorization database is to be checked for modifications.

#### Parameters

*seconds*

The number seconds between checks for modifications.

#### Defaults

```
acc.authrefresh 43200
```

#### Notes

- 1) The **acc** component periodically checks to see if the authorization database has changed. If it has changed, **xrootd** rebuilds internal authorization information from the database. This means that the **authrefresh** directive determines the information currency.
- 2) Lower **authrefresh** *seconds* values increase **xrootd** overhead because internal information may need to be rebuilt more frequently.
- 3) Higher **authrefresh** *seconds* values decrease **xrootd** overhead. However, authorization information may be out of date for an excessively long period of time.
- 4) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

#### Example

```
acc.authrefresh 10800
```

### 3.4 encoding

```
acc.encoding args
```

```
args: [pct path] [space char]
```

#### Function

Specify the encoding of access control targets.

#### Parameters

**pct** Specifies that the arguments are percent-encoded (a.k.a. url-encoded). Currently, the only target that may be percent-encoded is the path, which must be specified as an argument.

**space** Specifies that the id's may be encoded with a character, *char*, that should be converted to a space. The ids that may be encoded with a space character are: group, organization, role, and user. Specify for *char* a single character that should be converted to a space in any of the aforementioned ids.

#### Defaults

None, no encoding is recognized.

#### Notes

- 1) The pct encoding is most useful for specifying imbedded spaces in a path using the standard %20 sequence. When enabled all paths are percent-decoded before being used for authorization.
- 2) When a space character is specified, all relevant id's are scanned for this character and each occurrence is replaced by a space before the id is used for authorization purposes.

#### Example

```
acc.encoding pct path space ^
```

### 3.5 gidlifetime

```
acc.gidlifetime seconds
```

#### Function

Controls how long group membership information may be cached in memory.

#### Parameters

*seconds*

The number seconds group membership information may be cached before it must be discarded and subsequently re-determined, as needed. The value may be suffixed by **s**, **h**, or **m** (the case is immaterial) to indicate that seconds (the default), minutes, or hours are being specified, respectively.

#### Defaults

```
acc.gidlifetime 12h
```

#### Notes

- 1) Because it is relatively expensive to determine a user's groups, **xrootd** caches the information in memory for a limited time so that subsequent requests for the user's group memberships can be quickly satisfied. Since the user's groups may change, the information is cached for a limited time. After the time interval expires, the membership information is discarded so that the next request for the user's groups will cause the information to be recomputed.
- 2) Lower **gidlifetime** *seconds* values increase **xrootd** overhead because group membership information may need to be rebuilt more frequently.
- 3) Higher **gidlifetime** *seconds* values decrease **xrootd** overhead. However, group membership information may be out of date for an excessively long period of time.
- 4) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

#### Example

```
acc.gidlifetime 4h
```

### 3.6 gidretran

```
acc.gidretran gid [ gid [ . . . ] ]
```

#### Function

Specify the Unix group ids that are aliases. See the notes on when to use this directive.

#### Parameters

*gid* A Unix group number that is an alias for some other group number.

#### Defaults

None.

#### Notes

- 1) The **gidretran** directive may be used by large installations running NIS<sup>8</sup> to disambiguate group names. Large installations may have a group membership list that is too large for a single group name entry. The typical solution is to break-up the membership list and assign it to two or more group names, each having the same group id number (**gid**). This leads to ambiguity as to which name should be used. The **gidretran** directive can record all such **gid**'s so that the authorization system knows when to retranslate a group name to its base name (e.g., the one shown via the **ls** command), as determined by the **getgrgid()** function.
- 2) Up to 128 group ids may be specified.
- 3) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

#### Example

```
acc.gidretran 10200 10201 10202
```

---

<sup>8</sup> NIS+ does not have the problem described in this paragraph.

### 3.7 nisdomain

```
acc.nisdomain name
```

#### Function

Specify the domain name to use when determining membership in a NIS netgroup.

#### Parameters

*name* The NIS domain name to use.

#### Defaults

None. By default, a null domain name is used so that membership is solely determined based on the user's name and the originating host name.

#### Notes

- 1) Membership in a NIS netgroup is determined by three factors:
  - a. User's originating host name,
  - b. The user's actual name, and
  - c. An arbitrary domain name.The factors are commonly referred to as the (machine,user, domain) triple. The **innnetgr()** function determines whether a triple is a member of a particular **netgroup**. When the domain name is not specified, then only the machine and user fields are used to determine membership in the a group, regardless of the domain specified in the NIS **netgroup** file.
- 2) Netgroup membership is only meaningful when the authorization database contains privileges based on **netgroup** name (i.e., **n** record type was specified).
- 3) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

#### Example

```
acc.nisdomain slacxrd
```

### 3.8 pgo

`acc.pgo`

#### Function

Specify how Unix group membership affects authorization.

#### Parameters

None.

#### Defaults

All of the groups in which a user is a member determine the user's privileges.

#### Notes

- 3) By default, all of a user's Unix groups determine the user's access privileges. This is the **POSIX** standard. Installations wishing **SVR5** behavior should specify the **pgo** directive. When **pgo** is specified, only the user's primary group determines the user's privileges.
- 4) The **pgo** directive can substantially reduce **xrootd** overhead when many users have very long group membership lists.
- 5) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

#### Example

```
acc.pgo
```

## 4 Authorization Database File

Authorization information may come from various sources, depending on the installation. The supplied implementation uses a flat Unix file to record authorization information. Regardless of the information source, the following semantics prevail.

An authorization database contains one or more authorization records.

Each authorization record is considered to be a capability.

Each capability is tied to a unique identifier within its name class.

An identifier may be a

- host name,
- domain name,
- netgroup name,
- organization name,
- role name,
- template name,
- group name (e.g. Unix, VOMS, etc),
- user name

All template identifiers are logically processed in the order specified. The processing order of other identifiers is immaterial.

Each identifier is associated with an arbitrary list of path prefix-privilege pairs.

The list is always searched from left to right (i.e., in the order that it was specified).

The privileges associated with first prefix that matches an incoming path name are considered to be the applicable privileges.

Additionally, the flat file implementation allows for

- comments (i.e., any record whose first character is a pound sign, #),
- blank records, and
- continuations designated by a back slash (\) as the last non-blank character on the continued record.

## 4.1 Authorization Database Record Definition

```

idtype id { {path | \objectid} privs | tname } [ { {path | \objectid} privs | tname } [ ••• ] ]
idtype: g | h | n | o | r | s | t | u | x
privs: plets | -plets | plets-plets
plets: { a | d | i | k | l | n | r | w } [ plets ]

```

Where:

*idtype*

is a single letter indicating the type of identifier that follows. Valid type letters are:

<b>g</b> - group name	<b>o</b> - organization name	<b>t</b> - template name
<b>h</b> - host/domain name	<b>r</b> - role name	<b>u</b> - user name
<b>n</b> - netgroup name	<b>s</b> - <a href="#">special inclusive</a>	<b>x</b> - <a href="#">special exclusive</a>

*id*

The actual identifier. Identifier must be consistent with their type. Additionally, host names must be fully qualified and specified in lower case. Should a host name start with a period, it is treated as a domain name. A domain name must match the right-most characters of a host name in order for the associated capability to be used. An *id* can appear in only one rule.

*\objectid*

The object identifier prefix to be used for matching purposes.

*path*

The path prefix to be used for matching purposes.

*privs*

The privileges associated with the preceding path. Privilege letters preceding a minus sign represent the privileges being granted. Privilege letters following the minus sign represent the privileges being denied. Privilege letters stand for:

<b>a</b> - all privileges	<b>l</b> - lookup a file (i.e., search directory)
<b>d</b> - delete (i.e., remove) a file	<b>n</b> - rename a file
<b>i</b> - insert (i.e., create) a file	<b>r</b> - read a file
<b>k</b> - lock a file (not used)	<b>w</b> - write a file

*tname* A previously defined (i.e., occurring earlier in the file) template name. The template's associated path-privs list is logically substituted for the template name.

### Notes

- 1) Any number of database records (i.e., lines terminated by a new line, \n, character) may be specified.
- 2) A database record may be continued to another record by placing a back slash (\) character at the end of the record (i.e., last non-blank character). Continuations are useful for long specifications since you are not allowed to specify the same id within a type more than once.
- 3) Data records whose first character is a pound sign (#) are treated as comments.
- 4) Blank database records are ignored.
- 5) Only one particular *idtype-id* combination may appear in the authorization files. Therefore, you must specify all capabilities for an *idtype-id* in one record. Use continuation syntax to improve readability.
- 6) The path-privs and objected-privs entries are always matched from left to right. Therefore, specify paths and objectids from most significant to least significant order (i.e., all exceptions or longest paths first)
- 7) The authorization system does not perform multiple slash removal. Therefore a path prefix of /foo/bar and /foo/bar, while logically the same, are treated as two distinct specifications.
- 8) While prefix matching does not differentiate file system objects, paths ending with a slash logically indicate a directory. This type of specification works consistently with all operations except "stat" and "list". The reason is that these operations specify directory names without a trailing slash.
- 9) In order to maintain a file system object view in a path prefix matching model, the look-up privilege should be granted to all users for all path prefixes.
- 10) Certain privileges should be granted together. For instance, insert privileges should be granted along with delete privileges, and write with read.
- 11) The user record type is also used to convey default privileges and specified referential privileges. Refer to the following sections for more information.
- 12) Not all authentication methods convey all identities. For instance, **gsi** authentication may convey a role while **unix** authentication cannot.
- 13) The **s** and **x** rules use special compound id. See the next section on how to use these rules

## Example

```
t base /fie l
u abh /fie/foo/fum/ a /fie/foo/ rw base
```

A template named `base` has been defined. It provides for look-up privileges to any file system object whose path starts with `/fie`. In this examples, it also implies that the contents of the `fie` directory can be listed. Subsequently, user `abh` is granted all permissions for file system objects that start with `/fie/foo/fum/` (i.e., in directory `fum`), read-write permissions for all file system objects that start with `/fie/foo/` (i.e., in directory `foo`) and whatever privileges that are afforded by template `base`.

### 4.1.1 Defining Special Compound ID's for s and x rules

The authorization system allows you to define special identifiers that capture one or more identity components (e.g. name, group, role, organization, etc.). These id's can be used to specify privileges granted to clients that match the compound identity using the s and x rules. This is shown below.

```
= id idspec [ idspec [ ••• ] ]

{s | x} id { {path | \objectid} privs | tname } [ { {path | \objectid} privs | tname } [ ••• ] ]

idspec: g groupname | h hostname | o orgname | r rolename | u username

privs: plets | -plets | plets-plets

plets: { a | d | i | k | l | n | r | w } [ plets ]
```

Where:

*id* an arbitrary but unique identifier. The identifier is associated with the subsequent client identity specification, *idspec*. The *id* can be used in a subsequent s or x rule and can only appear in one rule.

*idspec* is a single letter indicating the type of entity identifier that follows. You must specify one or more of them. Valid type specifications are:

**g** - group name            **o** - organization name        **u** - user name  
**h** - host/domain name    **r** - role name

Should a host name start with a period, it is treated as a domain name. A domain name must match the right-most characters of a host name. Any single letter entity identifier may only appear once in an *idspec* list. An *id* associated with the specified *idspec* is considered a match when all of the entity identifiers are true for a client (i.e. the whole *idspec* applies).

**s** specifies an inclusive capability for the *id*. Inclusive capabilities add and remove privileges granted by other matching rules.

- x specifies an exclusive capability for the *id*. Exclusive capabilities determine privileges irrespective of other matching rules, as follows:
  - o The system attempts to match the client's identity against all x rules in the order that they appear in the authorization file.
  - o The first matching rule establishes the client's capabilities irrespective of any other rules that may apply to the client.

*\objectid path privs tname*

these are identical in meaning to those described in the previous section.

### Notes

- 1) Since x rules are applied first *and* in the order that they appear in the authorization file with the first matching rule establishing capabilities, you should specify x rules in decreasing specificity.
- 2) The order in which you define special compound id's is immaterial. However, an id must be defined before it is used.

### Example

```
= atlddm o atlas r production u ddm
= atlprod o atlas r production
x atlddm /atlas ld
x atlprod /atlas lrw
o atlas /atlas lr
```

A client whose name is ddm *and* is a member of the atlas organization *and* has a role of production is allowed to lookup and delete files in /atlas. A client who is a member of the atlas organization *and* has a role of production is allowed to lookup, read and write files in /atlas. Otherwise, client's who are members of the atlas organization can only lookup and read file in /atlas.

### 4.1.2 Default Privileges

Default privileges may be specified using the user record type, as follows.

```
u * { path privs | tname } [ { path privs | tname } [ ••• ] ]
```

The use of an asterisk as the user name indicates that the specified privileges are to apply to all users, regardless of their user name and location (subject to other applicable negative privileges). The default specification is useful for granting all users look-up privileges on the complete file space in order to maintain a file system view of authorization.

### 4.1.3 User Fungible Capabilities

Privileges may be granted to specific paths that encode the user's name without having to specify each such path for every user as follows:

```
u = { path privs | tname } [ { path privs | tname } [ ••• ] ]
```

Each path in **UFC** record should contain the character sequence “@=”. The first such sequence indicates where the user's name should be substituted before a path prefix match is attempted. This allows you to provide for file system areas that are effectively “owned” by a user without needing to specify the actual user's name.

#### Example

```
u * /xrd lr
u = /xrd/users/@=/ a
```

All users, by default, have read and look-up access for any file system object prefixed by `/xrd` (i.e., in directory `xrd`). However, users have all privileges for any file system object that is prefixed by `/xrd/users/`, followed by their user name, and ending with a slash (i.e., in a directory that corresponds to their user name).



## 5 Document Change History

### 1 June 2005

- Add the generalized **if** facility explanation.

### 18 July 2005

- Include GIS and PWD protocol information. Supplied by Gerri Ganis, CERN.

### 22 March 2006

- Add **exec** condition to **if/else/fi**.

### 23 May 2006

- Discuss the authorization plug-in and the **ofs.authlib** directive.

### 2 April 2007

- Move explanation of conditional directives to another manual.
- Some minor clean-up.

### 2 August 2007

- Add **unix** protocol description.
- Some minor clean-up.

### 8 January 2008

- General clean-up.

### 3 October 2008

- Add **sss** protocol description.

### 29 January 2009

- Add **usrgroup** option to the **sss** protocol.

### 7 April 2009

- Remove **loginid** option from the **sss** protocol.

### 25 November 2009

- Add **ssl** protocol description.

### 6 June 2011

- Make **xrdsssadmin** example for distributing keys more obvious.

**27 September 2011**

- Remove description of the **krb4** and **ssl** protocols.
- Fully describe all of the gsi security options.
- Describe the generic AuthzVO plug-in.

----- **Release 3.1.0**

**22 February 2012**

- Add options 12 and 13 to “-crl:” to gsi security. Mentions these for envar XrdSecGSICRLCHECK.
- Add the “-crlrefresh:” option to gsi security.

----- **Release 3.1.1**

**6 April 2012**

- Correct type: change “validvo” to “valido” as the **VOMS** way of screening valid organizations in x.509 certificates.

----- **Release 3.2.0**

----- **Release 3.2.1**

----- **Release 3.2.2**

----- **Release 3.2.3**

----- **Release 3.2.4**

**26 September 2012**

- Document the **sslhashold** gsi security option.
- Document **vomsfun** and **vomsfunargs** gsi switches

----- **Release 3.2.5 to 3.2.7**

----- **Release 3.3.0 to 3.3.2**

**7 February 2013**

- Add link to external plug-in for **VOMS** extraction7 February 201313 October 20227 February 2013
- Remove description of **sslhashold** which was suppressed because an automatic mechanism to handle hash algorithms has been implemented
- Regenerate index and fix some typos

----- **Release 3.3.3 to 3.3.6**

----- **Release 4.0.1 to 4.0.3**

### 15 October 2014

- Explain how to create forward-able sss tokens using **xrdsssadmin**.

----- **Release 4.1.0 to 4.3.0**

----- **Release 4.4.0**

### 19 June 2016

- Explain how to do authorization based on objected.

----- **Release 4.5.0 to 4.6.0**

### 9 October 2016

- Explain the **sec.level** directive.

----- **Release 4.7.0**

### 7 April 2017

- Document the 'o' and 'r' record types in the authorization database.

### 3 August 2017

- Document the '=', 's' and 'x' record types in the authorization database.

### 27 October 2017

- Correct the '=' compound type specification.

### 20 June 2018

- Better document the **dlgpxy gsi** option.
- Document the extended **exppxy gsi** option.
- Remove the redundant **XrdSecGSISIGNPROXY** client-side envar.

### 22 July 2018

- Add **fattr** request to the signing table.

**12 March 2020**

- Provide full names for single letter options for the **sss** protocol.
- Document the **sss** protocol **-getcreds** and **-keyname** options.
- Document proxy authentication for the **sss** protocol.

**17 March 2020**

- Documents the **sec.entitylib** directive.

**16 May 2020**

- Rewrite the **gsi** protocol section to make it more approachable.
- Add details on the **VOMS** plug-in.

**19 May 2020**

- Document the new version of the **-vomsfunparms grpopt** option.

**5 June 2020**

- Document the new version of the **-authzpxy**, **-ca**, **-crl**, **-dlgpxy**, **-gmapopt**, and **-vomsat gsi** options.
- Document the **-authzcall** and **-trustdns gsi** options.
- Document the removal of the **gsi** built-in **VOMS** extractor and the change of the **-vomsat** option default to **ignore**.

**11 November 2020**

- Correct documentation on how to specify the *idtype* (i.e. the single letter is *not* followed by a colon).

**15 January 2021**

- Document the **ztn** client validation protocol.

**15 February 2021**

- Document **-expiry** option in the **ztn** client validation protocol.

**17 February 2021**

- Remove the controversial **ztn** options **-rt** and **-use**.

**6 August 2021**

- Document the **acc.encoding** directive

**13 October 2022**

- Do not imply that group name must be a Unix name in the auth DB file.