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<th>Configuration</th>
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# 1 Introduction

This document describes the configuration of the security and the default access control components of the extended root daemon (xrootd). Configuration directives use a special prefix for each component that allows you to use a single configuration file. The prefixes are shown in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sec</td>
<td>Security authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acc</td>
<td>Access control (i.e., authorization)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Configuration directives for each component come from a configuration file specified when xrootd is started (see the –c option xrootd option).

Records that do not start with a recognized identifier are ignored. This includes blank record and comment lines (i.e., lines starting with a pound sign, #). This guide documents the acc and sec configuration directives. Other directives are documented in supplemental guide specific to the component they deal with.

Refer to the manual “Configuration File Syntax” on how to specify and use conditional directives and set variables. These features are indispensable for complex configuration files usually encountered in large installations.

By default, security and access control features are disabled. These features can be enabled with the following xrootd and ofs directives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directive</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>xrootd.fslib</td>
<td>Load the shared library implementing the ofs and acc components.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xrootd.seclib</td>
<td>Load the shared library implementing the sec (authentication) component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ofs.authlib</td>
<td>Load the shared library implementing a special acc component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ofs.authorize</td>
<td>Enables access control, acc component.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.1 Client/Server Authentication

The authentication component is structured as a highly versatile multi-protocol suite. In order to accomplish this task, it is organized into a set of shared libraries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shared Library</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>libXrdSec.so</td>
<td>Protocol manager and host-based authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libXrdSecgsi.so</td>
<td>Dynamically loadable GSI authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libXrdSeckrb5.so</td>
<td>Dynamically loadable Kerberos V authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libXrdSecpwd.so</td>
<td>Dynamically loadable password-based authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libXrdSecsss.so</td>
<td>Dynamically loadable simple shared secret authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libXrdSecunix.so</td>
<td>Dynamically loadable unix-based authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LibXrdSecxxxx.so</td>
<td>Dynamically loadable xxxx authentication protocol.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This means that libXrdSec.so must be available since it is needed to boot-strap additional protocols. The corresponding shared library must be available for each requested protocol (e.g., krb5).

For servers, the location of libXrdSec.so is specified using the xroot seclib directive (see the “xrd & xrootd Configuration Guide”). Additional libraries are specified using the sec.protocol directive documented in this guide.

For clients, the task of deploying shared libraries is more problematic because library placement and location is not immediately obvious. The same rules apply; libXrdSec.so and any additional protocol libraries must be available. Typically, these libraries should be placed in one of the directories listed in the client’s LD_LIBRARY_PATH environmental variable or installed in the default loader’s search path. Alternatively, they can be placed in a well-known linker/loader location (e.g., /usr/local/lib).

The client will load libraries, as available, compatible with the security configuration defined for the server. Thus, the server controls what protocols the client will use, if any. While this potentially simplifies security administration, it does complicate the client-side environment. This is because the client may be potentially running multiple protocols at the same time, depending on what set of servers the client wants to use. Generally, however, this is transparent to the client application.
1.2 Server Authorization

The default authorization component is already built into xrootd and needs only to be activated using the \texttt{ofs.authorize} directive. If you use the default authorization scheme, you must also create an authorization file that lists client capabilities. The file is specified by the \texttt{acc.authdb} directive. Procedures must be developed to properly share this file with all of the servers that rely on it to provide cohesive access control. Fortunately, authorization is only a server-side issue.

Other authorization schemes may be used with xrootd. A specific scheme is implemented as a plug-in. The shared library containing the implementation is then specified using the \texttt{ofs.authlib} directive.

In a clustered environment, authorization should be enabled on all actual data servers since clients might bypass a redirector and communicate directly with a data server. Consider enabling authorization at the redirector level only if you need to control file requests. Since a request for a file does not implicitly allow actual access to file data; authorization at the redirector level generally does not enhance security but may add significant overhead.
2 Authentication Configuration

2.1 entitylib

```
ofs.entitylib [++] path [parms]
```

**Function**
Specify the location of the client entity decryption post processor.

**Parameters**
++ The specified plug-in should stack on top of the existing plug-in or default. A stacked plug-in cannot be overridden by a subsequent directive.

path The absolute path to the shared library that contains an implementation of the post processor plug-in.

parms Optional parameters to be passed to the post processor plug-in

**Defaults**
By default no additional post processing occurs after the client is authenticated.

**Notes**
1) The entity processor interface is defined in the `XrdSecEntityPin.hh` include file. Refer to this file on how to create a custom post processor.
2) Even though authentication has succeeded, the post processor may reject the authenticated entity. When authentication fails he message returned to the client, and perhaps printed in the log, may be sufficient to resolve which part of the authentication process actually failed.

**Example**
```
sec.entitylib /opt/xrootd/lib/libEntityProc.so
```
2.2 level

```
sec.level {all | local | remote} [relaxed] level [force]
```

**Function**

Specify the request verification level.

**Parameters**

- **all**  The verification level applies to all clients. This is the default.

- **local** The verification level applies only to clients in the server’s DNS domain.

- **remote** The verification level applies only to clients outside the server’s DNS domain.

- **relaxed** applies the specified level of verification to clients that support request verification. Old clients that don’t support verification are not included. This option is meant to allow a non-disruptive client software upgrade path.

- **level** Is the verification level:
  - **none**  requests are not to be verified. This is the default unless the **level** directive specifies otherwise.
  - **compatible** verifies only potentially destructive requests (i.e. those that modify file data or metadata. This provides backward compatibility for old clients that only require read-only access to data.
  - **standard** includes compatible verification plus key requests that access data.
  - **intense** includes standard verification plus additional requests that access metadata.
  - **pedantic** verifies all requests.
force requires verification even for authentication protocols that do not support encryption. Normally, when a client authenticates with a protocol that does not support generic encryption, verification is not employed. This option is meant for debugging purposes as it does not provide enhanced security.

Defaults
sec.level all none

Notes
1) Request verification uses cryptographic signing to ensure that a request has been sent by the client that the server has previously authenticated.
2) Request verification requires that the authentication protocol used to authenticate a client supports generic encryption. Currently, only gsi authentication protocol supports generic encryption.
3) A client is considered to be in the same DNS domain when all DNS name components, other than the first one, match corresponding name components of the server.
4) The following section specifies the verification used for each request by specified level other than none.

Example
sec.level local none
sec.level remote standard
### 2.2.1 Verification performed by level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Compatible</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Intense</th>
<th>Pedantic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>auth</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bind</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chmod</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>checkpoint</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
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<tr>
<td>close</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dirlist</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>endsess</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
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<tr>
<td>fattr</td>
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<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>gpfile</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>locate</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>login</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mkdir</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mv</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open read</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open Write</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pgread</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pgwrite</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
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<tr>
<td>ping</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>prepare</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protocol</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query special</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>read</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>readv</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rm</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rmdir</td>
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<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set special</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sigver</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stat</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>statx</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sync</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>truncate</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>write</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>verified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2.3 protbind

```
sec.protbind hostpat { none | [ only ] protocols }
hostpat: prefix[*][suffix] | [prefix][*]suffix | localhost
```

**Function**

Bind a set of protocols to one or more hosts.

**Parameters**

**hostpat**

The hostname pattern to be used for matching host names. A pattern is a standard DNS name with an optional single asterisk somewhere in the specification. All of the characters prior to the asterisk (i.e., `prefix`) must match the left-most characters of the host name and all of the characters after the asterisk (i.e., `suffix`) must match the right-most characters of the host name. If the `hostpat` does not contain an asterisk, the all of the characters must match.

**none** Indicates that incoming clients from hosts matching `hostpat` need not supply any credentials.

**only** Indicates that incoming clients from hosts matching `hostpat` must supply credentials using one of the `protocols` that follow.

**protocols**

One or more blank-separated protocol ids that are to be bound to the host. Each protocol id must have been previously defined with the `protocol` directive.

**localhost**

substitutes the DNS registered name of the current host.
Defaults

All of the defined protocols are presented to each connecting client as acceptable authentication protocols. See the notes on how to change the default.

Notes

1) The protbind directive allows you to determine which authentication protocols are valid from which host. Alternatively, the protbind directive can be used to lessen authentication requirements from certain hosts (e.g., those behind a firewall vs. the ones outside a firewall).

2) Incoming clients from hosts bound to none are not asked to supply credentials.

3) Order is important. Host matching occurs in reverse order of specification. Specify the most general hostpat first and the least general, last.

4) If the hostpat is a single asterisk, then this defines the actual default for all unbound hosts.

5) The protbind directive is meant to lessen the security requirements on certain hosts. Unless only is specified, it does not restrict a host from using any defined security protocol, even if that protocol is not presented to the host as an option.

6) Because host protocol is the least restrictive authentication mechanism, binding the built-in host protocol to a host makes any other bindings to the host superfluous.

Example

sec.protbind bronco*slac.stanford.edu host
2.5 protocol

| sec.protocol | [ libpath ] protid [ parms ] |

**Function**
Define the characteristics of an authentication protocol.

**Parameters**

*libpath*
The absolute path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader’s search path or the **LD_LIBRARY_PATH** environmental variable.

*protid* The unique 1- to 7-character protocol identifier.

*parms* The parameters required by the protocol to operate successfully. The parameters are protocol dependent. The notes and subsequent sections describe the parameters needed for various protocols. The *parms* can also be specified with the **protparm** directive.

**Defaults**
There are no defaults. Each protocol must be appropriately defined in order for it to be used.

**Notes**
1) Each supported protocol has a 1- to 4-character unique identifier, the *protid*. The **sec** component currently comes with support for these protocols:
   - **host** authenticates a user by originating host name only,
   - **gsi** authenticates a user using GSI protocol,
   - **krb5** authenticates a user using Kerberos V protocol, and
   - **pwd** authenticates a user using a password-based protocol
   - **sss** authenticates a user using a simple shared secret protocol
   - **unix** authenticates using the Unix login name and group name
   Other protocols may be supported by an installation. Refer to the “xrootd Developer’s Reference” on how to add new protocol support.
2) Even though the host protocol is built-in, it will not be used unless specified with a **protocol** directive.
3) Because **host** protocol is the least restrictive authentication mechanism; allowing its unbound use (see the **protbind** directive) makes all other protocols superfluous. A warning message is issued if you define the host protocol but do not restrict its use to certain hosts.

4) The following sections describe the required parameters, **parms**, for each protocol requiring configuration (**host** protocol does not need any parameters).

5) **Warning:** **host** and **unix** protocols do not provide any significant level of security and should only be used in instances where security violations do not matter.

**Example**

```plaintext
sec.protocol host
```
### 2.5.1 gsi protocol

```
sec.protocol [libpath] gsi [basic] [authz] [gmap] [voms]

**basic:**
- `-ca:` [noverify|verifyss|verify]]
- `-cert:` [file]
- `-certdir:` [dir]
- `-cipher:` [ciphers]
- `-crl:` [ignore|try|use[,updt]|require[,updt]]
- `-crldir:` [dir]
- `-crlext:` [extension]
- `-crlrefresh:` [period]
- `-d:` [level]
- `-dlgpxy:` [ignore|request]
- `-exppxy:` [template|creds]
- `-key:` [file]
- `-md:` [mds]
- `-showdn:` [true|false]
- `-trustdns:` [true|false]

**authz:**
- `-authzfun:` [file]
- `-authzfunparms:` [parms]
- `-authzpxy:` [cred|endor] = [fullchain|lastcert]
- `-authzto:` [to]
- `-authzcall:` [always|novoms]

**gmap:**
- `-gmapfun:` [file]
- `-gmapfunparms:` [parms]
- `-gmapopt:` [nomap[,usedn]|trymap[,usedn]|usemap]
- `-gmappto:` [to]
- `-gridmap:` [file]

**voms:**
- `-vomsat:` [ignore|extract|require]
- `-vomsfun:` [file|default]
- `-vomsfunparms:` [parms]
```
Function

Define the characteristics of the gsi authentication protocol.

Parameters

libpath

The absolute directory path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by loader or the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environmental variable.

basic Options

-ca:{noverify | verifyss | verify}

Defines the CA verification level:

noverify do not verify;
verifyss verify if self-signed, issuing a warning if not;
verify always verify the CA in the chain, failing when not possible.
Default is verifyss.

-cert:file

Specifies an alternative path for the file containing the certificate to be used by the server; the path leading to file can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; ‘~/’ is expanded to $HOME.
Default: /etc/grid-security/xrd/xrdcert.pem

certdir:dir

Specifies an alternative directory path for trusted Certificate Authority certificates; the path indicated by dir can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; ‘~/’ is expanded to $HOME.
Default: /etc/grid-security/certificates

cipher:ciphers

Specifies a colon-separated list of ciphers to be used for the session symmetric key. Default is “aes-128-cbc:bf-cbc:des-ede3-cbc” (OpenSSL naming convention).
-crl: {ignore|try|use,updt|require,updt]

  Defines the type of check to be performed on CRLs:
  
  ignore     ignore any CRL information for the CA being used for certificate
             chain verification;
  try        try to use CRL if available; if the CRL certificate is missing for a
             given CA, the related CRL is assumed to be empty;
  use        use CRL for any trusted CA, but do not fail if the CRL certificate is
             not up-to-date;
  require    require an up-to-date CRL for each CA;
  updtt      attempt to download missing or expired CRLs. Unless updt is
             specified, no attempt is made to update the CRLs.

  Default is try.

-crldir:dir

  Specifies an alternative directory path for CRL certificates; the path indicated
  by dir can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started;
  ‘~/’ is expanded to $HOME. By the default CRLs are searched for in the same
  path as for CA certificates.

-crlext:extension

  Specifies an alternative default extension for CRL files. Default is “.r0”.

-crlrefresh:period

  Controls period for refreshing the CRL information; value in seconds.
  Negative values disable the automatic refresh. Default one day (86400 secs).

-d:level

  Sets the verbosity level for this module to level; the level can be set to 1 (low),
  2 (medium) or 3 (high or dump). Invoking xrootd with the verbose option -d
  sets the internal verbosity for this module to 1.

  Default is 0.
-dlgpxy: [ignore | request]
   Specify if the server should request a delegated proxy from the client:
   ignore    do not ask the client for a delegated proxy certificate;
   request   ask the client for a delegated proxy; the result depends on the
             setting of the client’s XrdSecGSIDELEGPXY environment variable.
   Default is ignore.

-exppxy:template or exppxy:=creds
   Specifies the exported location of the delegated proxy certificate when the
   dlgpxy switch enables it. Specifying a template writes the certificate to a file
   whose name corresponds to the template specification. Specifying =creds
   makes the certificate available via the XrdSecEntity.creds with the length set
   in the XrdSecEntity.credslen field.
   A template can contain one or more of the following place-holders which are
   resolved dynamically:
   <user>       client username;
   <uid>        client user ID;
   <host>       client host name;
   <vorg>       client virtual organization;
   <group>      client group.
   Default is /tmp/x509up_u<uid>.

-key:file
   Specifies an alternative path for the file containing the private key associated
   with the server certificate (server must have read access to the file); the path
   leading to file can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is
   started; ‘~ /’ is expanded to $HOME.
   Default: /etc/grid-security/xrd/xrdkey.pem

-md:mds
   Specifies a colon-separated list of message digests to be used for integrity
   checks and signatures. Default is sha1:md5 (OpenSSL naming convention).

-showdn:{true | false}
   Specifies whether or not to display the certificate’s subject distinguished
   name along with the associated entity name when the entity name differs
   from the subject DN. The default is false.
-trustdns: [true | false]
  Specifies whether or not to use the Domain Name System (DNS) to validate hostnames in certificates. This may need to occur if the certificate does not have a SAN extension or the hostname is an alias. See the usage notes for admonitions. The default is false.

**authz Options**

-authzcall: [always | novoms]
  Specifies when the authzfun plug-in should be called:
  always  the plug-in is always called;
  novoms  the plug-in is only called when the vomsfun plug-in fails.
  Default is always and is the case when no vomsfun plug-in exists.

-authzfun: file
  file is the full path of the shared library containing a plug-in to be called after a successful authentication handshake to complete the identity information.

-authzfunparms: parms
  parms are the parameters to be used to initialize the plug-in defined by authzfun.

-authzpxy: [cred | endor]=[fullchain | lastcert]
  Specifies how the authzfun proxy information is exported in the XrdSecEntity structure:
  cred  place in the XrdSecEntity.creds field;
  endor place in the XrdSecEntity.endorsements field;
  fullchain use the full proxy chain (CA, certificate, proxies)
  lastcert use only the last user proxy certificate.
  Default is to not export proxy information.

-authzto: to
  Expiration time in seconds for entries in the cache associated with the authorization function defined by authzfun. Default is 43200 seconds, i.e. 12 hours.
gmap Options

-gmapfun:\texttt{file}
\texttt{file} is the full path of the shared library containing a plug-in function to be used to map DN\textquoteright{}s to usernames in addition to the grid-map file.

-gmapfunparms:\texttt{parms}
Defines the parameters to be used to initialize the plug-in mapping function defined by \texttt{gmapfun}; multiple parameters are `|`-separated. See the dedicated section below for details.

-gmapopt: \{\texttt{nomap},\texttt{usedn}\} | \texttt{trymap},\texttt{usedn} | \texttt{usemap}
Specify how to handle the grid-map file.
\begin{itemize}
  \item \texttt{nomap} do not map; use the hash of the client\textquoteright{}s DN as the user identifier (username);
  \item \texttt{trymap} try to map the DN but if unsuccessful use the hash of the client\textquoteright{}s DN as the user identifier (username);
  \item \texttt{usemap} require mapping (fail at initialization if file is missing or not readable and fail if a DN mapping cannot be found);
  \item \texttt{usedn} use the client DN as the user identifier instead of a hash.
\end{itemize}
Default is \texttt{trymap}.

-gmapto:to
Expiration time in seconds for entries in the cache associated with the grid-map file or the mapping function defined by \texttt{gmapfun}.
Default is -1, i.e. no expiration.

-gridmap:\texttt{file}
Specify an alternative location for the grid-map to be searched for if \texttt{gmapopt} is non null.
Default is /etc/grid-security/grid-mapfile.
**voms Options**

**vomsat: {ignore|extract|require}**

specify how to handle VOMS attributes using the `vomsfun` plug-in:

- **ignore**  
  ignore, i.e. do not look for VOMS extensions (ignore is changed to **require** when `-vomsfun` is specified);

- **extract**  
  extract all attributes and, if successful, fill in `XrdSecEntity.vorg`, `XrdSecEntity.role`, `XrdSecEntity.grps` fields, setting `XrdSecEntity.endorsements` to the full attribute list. Do not fail if attributes cannot be extracted;

- **require**  
  like `extract` but fail if the attributes are missing or cannot be extracted.

Default is **ignore**.

**vomsfun: {file|default}**

specifies the location of the `voms` plug-in:

- **file**  
  is the full path if a shared library containing a plug-in function to be called to extract information from the VOMS certificate extension;

- **default**  
  use the default `extractor` that comes with the `gsi` package.

Default is **default** when the **extract** or **require** option is in effect.

**vomsfunparms:parms**

`parms` are the parameters to be used to initialize the plug-in VOMS attributes extraction function defined by `vomsfun` option. Multiple parameters are `|`-separated.

Defaults

See description of each single option.
Notes

1) Servers usually use a dedicated service-certificate whose CN is of the form 
   CN = service/Fully.Qualified.Hostname
   e.g. CN = xrd/pcepsft43.cern.ch
   However, this is no longer sufficient as the current standard dictates that a 
   server’s host certificate should have a SAN extension containing the actual 
   full qualified host name regardless of what the CN contains.

2) The -crl ext option allows you to specify the CRL certificate files extension 
   as using a specific extension speeds the loading of certificates. If the 
   extension or the corresponding file is missing, the whole set of files in the 
   directory is tested to find the relevant CRL files; which is a slow process.

3) The order in which various plug-ins are applied is:
   a. The gmap plug-in if enabled by the -gmapfun option. Otherwise, 
      gridmap file processing is applied if enabled by the -gmapopt option.
   b. The VOMS plug-in if enabled by the -vomsfun option. Otherwise, the 
      built-in VOMS extraction is used if enabled by the -vomsat option.
   c. The authz plug-in if enabled by the -authzfun and -authzcall options.

4) The -trustdns option should only be used when needing to deal with 
   certificates without a SAN extension or when the certificate contains an 
   alias of the real hostname. These kinds of certificates are now considered 
   to be malformed. Enabling DNS usage is a security issue as a DNS can be 
   poisoned with false entries allowing a presented certificate to look as if it 
   belongs to the host being contacted; when in fact it is a malicious 
   intervening host. Avoid enabling DNS whenever possible.

5) For developers only: both the gmap and authz plug-ins support the special 
   option useglobals. This option is detected and used before the plug-in is 
   actually loaded and controls the way the symbols in the plug-in library 
   are made available to subsequent libraries, e.g. the ones loaded by the 
   plug-in itself. If useglobals is added to the option list the plug-in symbols 
   are made globally available, which means that dlopen is called with the 
   flag RTLDGLOBAL set. The useglobals option is removed from the 
   option list passed to the initialization call.

Example
   sec.protocol gsi -crl:3
Backward Compatibility

Starting in Release 5, the `-authzpxy`, `-ca`, `-crl`, `-dlgpst`, `-gmapopt`, and `-vomsat` options were changed to accept meaningful words as parameters. To achieve backward compatibility, the original numeric values are still accepted. The following tables show how each numeric value maps onto a descriptive argument. Be aware that in previous releases invalid numeric arguments were usually silently ignored or converted to something more acceptable. Starting in Release 5, invalid numeric arguments are flagged as invalid and the substituted value (as a specification) is displayed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><code>-authzpxy</code></th>
<th><code>-ca</code></th>
<th><code>-crl</code></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Specification</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>creds=fullchain</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>endor=fullchain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>creds=lastcert</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>endor=lastcert</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><code>-dlgpst</code></th>
<th><code>-gmapopt</code></th>
<th><code>-vomsat</code></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Specification</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>ignore</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>request</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Backward Compatibility Changes

In Release 5, the built-in VOMS extractor is no longer available as it is not secure and may not correctly parse certain VOMS attributes. The default `-vomsat` value consequently changed from extract to ignore. This means that to extract VOMS attributes either `-vomsfun` must be specified or `-vomsat` set to extract or require.
2.5.1.1 The authz plug-in

The GSI package comes with a general-purpose authz plug-in implemented in the libXrdSecgsiAuthzVO.so shared library. It can be used for simple mapping of virtual organization (VO) names to usernames or groups. It also, by default, trims the un-mapped usernames to the base distinguished name contained in the certificate. These actions are controlled by the authzfunparms parameter. The parameter is specified in the form of a CGI string (i.e., keyword=value with each pair separated by an ampersand (&). The parameters are as follows:

```
-authzfunparms: [keyword=value[&keyword=value[...]]]
keyword=value:  [debug=1] [valido=voname[,voname[,...]]]
              [vo2grp=gspec] [vo2usr=uspec]
```

where:

debug=1
Prints additional information involved in the mapping and should only be used for debugging purposes.

valido=vlist
vlist is a comma-separated list of VO names that are acceptable. If not specified, all virtual organizations are accepted. Otherwise, failure is returned if the VO is not in the list.

vo2grp=gspec
gspec specifies how the VO name is to be converted into a group name. Specify for gspec a printf-like format string with a single %s. The VO name is inserted where the %s occurs. To make the group name equal to the VO name, specify only %s (i.e. vo2grp=%s). If vo2grp is not specified, the group name is unchanged.
vo2usr=uspec

uspec specifies how the VO name is to be converted into a user name. Specify for uspec a printf-like format string with a single %s. The VO name is inserted where the %s occurs. To make the user name equal to the VO name, specify only %s (i.e. vo2usr=%s). If vo2usr is not specified, then the user name comes from distinguished name in the certificate (i.e. text after '/CN=' with spaces turned into underscores and the VO name is not used. Specifying vo2usr=* returns the user name as set by the gsi plug-in.

Notes

1) The AuthZ plug-in is called after the VOMS plug-in.
2) The AuthzVO plug-in is best used when gsi internal mapping is turned off. Normally, this requires that you also specify `-gmapopt:10 -gmapto:0` options.

Example

```
-gmapopt:10 -gmapto:0 -authzfun:libXrdAuthzVO.so \
-authzfunparms:valido=atlas,cms,vo2grp=us%s
```

The above example loads the AuthzVO plug-in. The parameters indicate that only VO names of atlas and cms are valid. The cms VO name will be converted to a group name of uscms and atlas VO will be converted to a group name of usatlas. The user name comes from the distinguished name in the certificate.

2.5.1.1.1 Implementing an authz plug-in

The plug-in consists of three external functions loaded from the shared library specified by the authzfun option. In addition to the main function, the plug-in should contain a function defining the string to be used to key the result of the call, and a function to initialize the plug-in. The three functions must all be declared as 'extern "C"'.

The initialization function, XrdSecgsiAuthzInit(), is called once at start-up. Then for each authentication, the XrdSecgsiAuthzKey() function is called first and if successful XrdSecgsiAuthzFun() is called to augment the XrdSecEntity object.
The initialization function has name and signature

```c
int XrdSecgsiAuthzInit(const char *parms)
```

where `parms` is a string that was specified using the `authzparms` option. This function should return <0 in case of failure or the positive format type of the proxy chain expected by the main function:

- 0 raw, to be used with XrdCrypto tools
- 1 PEM base64 standard string

The key function has name and signature:

```c
int XrdSecgsiAuthzKey(XrdSecEntity &entity, char **key)
```

`entity` is the `XrdSecEntity` as will be passed to `XrdSecgsiAuthzFun()`. The function is should fill in `*key` with the key used to cache the result of the `XrdSecgsiAuthzFun()` function and should return the length of the key. The key is destroyed with `delete []`, so it must be allocated internally with `new char[]`.

The main function has the following signature and name:

```c
int XrdSecgsiAuthzFun(XrdSecEntity &entity)
```

`entity` is the `XrdSecEntity` object associated with the handshake on the server side. On input `entity` contains:

- **name** holds the username, DN or DN hash according to the `-gmapopt` option;
- **host** holds the client hostname;
- **creds** or **endorsements** hold the proxy chain, as specified by the `-putpxy` option. The proxy chain can be either in raw opaque or PEM base64 format (see `XrdSecgsiAuthzInit()`).

This function should return

- 0 on success
- <0 on error (implies authentication failure)
2.5.1.2 The gmap plug-in

The GSI package does not come with an external `-gmapfun` plug-in. Instead, it uses an internal DN to username mapping function using a grid map file. The mapping parameters are specified by `-gmapopt` and `-gridmap` options. This is sufficient for simple sites with few users. More complicated sites should either implement their own gmap plug-in or use a Virtual Organization Management System (VOMS) and use the provided VOMS plug-in.

2.5.1.2.1 Implementing a gmap plug-in

This function can be used to integrate or replace the grid-map file. The function is loaded as a plug-in from the shared library specified by the `-gmapfun` option. It must be declared as `extern “C”` and must have the following name and signature

```c
extern “C” {
  char *XrdSecgsiGMAPFun(const char *DN, int now)
  {
    // DN is the user DN
    // now is the result of time(0)
    ...
    char *name = new char[length];
    ...
    return name;
  }
}
```

The function is called once after loading with the parameters defined by the `gmapfunparms` in the first argument (any ‘useglobals’ is removed; see below) and `now = 0` for initialization. Each parameter is separated by a vertical bar (`'|'`).

Subsequent calls pass the distinguished name and the function should return the name to be used in an allocated `new char[]` array. Returning a nil pointer indicates failure.

Working examples can be found in the source distribution in files

   XrdSecgsiGMAPFunDN.cc and XrdSecgsiGMAPFunLDAP.cc

under src/XrdSecgsi.
2.5.1.3 The voms plug-in

A general-purpose multi-vo VOMS extraction plug-in is part of the gsi package. It is implemented in the libXrdVoms.so shared library. Be aware that to use this plug-in the libvomsapi.so shared library must be installed. This is a generally available RPM from EPEL (for Linux see pkgs.org). The parameters are as follows:

```
-vomsfunparms: [option] [option] [option]

option: [dbg] [grpopt={usefirst | uselast | useall}]
[grps=gname[,gname[,...]]] [vos=vname[,vname[,...]]]
[gsiopts]

gsiopts: certfmt={pem | raw}
```

where:

dbg Prints additional information involved in the mapping and should only be used for debugging purposes.

certfmt Specifies how the certificate should be passed to the plug-in. This option is only relevant to the gsi plug-in. One of two formats may be specified:

- pem the certificate is to be passed as a base64 standard string.
- raw the certificate is to be passed as a binary string to be used with the XrdCrypto tools.

gropt gropt specifies how to handle multiple group membership. Acceptable groups may be restricted using the grps option. Otherwise, any group is considered acceptable. Specify one of:

- usefirst only the first acceptable group is used.
- uselast only the last acceptable group is used.
- useall all acceptable groups are used (the default).
grps  each gname specifies an acceptable group name. Only these group names are passed to the authorization framework. At least one listed group must be found in a voms extension for the plug-in to return success. If the grps option is not specified, all groups are accepted and the lack of any group presence does not cause failure.

vos  each vname specifies an acceptable Virtual Organization name. Only these VO names are passed to the authorization framework. If the vos option is not specified, then all virtual organization names are accepted. At least one acceptable VO name must exist for the plug-in to return success.

Defaults
See description of each single option.

Notes
1) The gsi framework voms plug-in can be loaded by the gsi authentication plug-in using the -vomsfun option or by http plug-in using the http.sectractor configuration directive.
2) The http plug-in uses https protocol to obtain client certificates for authentication. The https protocol uses x509 certificate format which is automatically accepted by the voms plug-in.
3) The gsi plug-in represents client certificates in raw binary format but is capable of converting them to PEM format. The certfmt option allows you to specify which format to use with the voms plug-in when using the plug-in with gsi. Usually, the default is sufficient.
4) In the unlikely event that the XrdCrypto package is not installed, the plug-in automatically requests a PEM format certificate.
5) For backward compatibility, the VOMS plug-in accepts the arcane, now deprecated, version of the grpopt:

\[ \text{grpopt= select*10+which} \]

- select  is 0 (use all groups that are present, the default) or 1 (consider only those specified in the grps option).
- which  is 0 (use the first acceptable one), 1 (use the last acceptable one), or 2 (use all of the relevant groups, the default).
2.5.1.3.1 Implementing a voms plug-in

This function can be used to fill the VOMS-related content of the XrdSecEntity structure for authorization purposes. The function is part of a set of two functions loaded from the file specified by the -vomsfun option. In addition to the main function, the plug-in should contain a function to initialize the plug-in. The two functions must all be declared as `extern “C”`.

The initialization function has name and signature

```c
int XrdSecgsiVOMSInit(const char *parms)
```

where `parms` is a string that was specified using the -vomsparms option. This function should return $<0$ in case of failure or the positive format type of the proxy chain expected by the main function:

- $0$ raw, to be used with XrdCrypto tools
- $1$ PEM base64 standard string

The main function has the following signature and name:

```c
int XrdSecgsiVOMSFun(XrdSecEntity &entity)
```

where `entity` is the XrdSecEntity object associated with the handshake on the server side. On input `entity` contains:

- in `name` the username, DN or DN hash according to the GMAP option;
- in `host` the client hostname;
- in `creds` the proxy chain.

The proxy chain can be either in raw opaque or PEM base64 format as requested by the XrdSecgsiVOMSInit() function.

This function returns

- $0$ on success
- $<0$ on error (implies authentication failure)

A working example can be found in the source distribution in the file `XrdSecgsiVOMSFunLite.cc` under src/XrdSecgsi.
2.5.1.4 Configuring GSI Security

2.5.1.4.1 Server side

Follow these steps to configure GSI protocol for xrootd:

1. Locate a valid certificate to be used by the server. This should be a host certificate with a valid SAN extension that specifies the fully qualified hostname. You can check if the certificate has a valid SAN extension with openssl x509 -text -in cert.pem-file | grep DNS:

2. Locate the directory path with the certificates for the trusted CAs. File names holding CA certificates are of the type <subject_hash>.0; for example, for the CERN CA, the certificate file is “1d879c6c.0”.

3. If strong requirements about the CRLs have to be applied, locate the CRL certificate files; these are usually located in the same directory as the CA certificates, have the same name but extension “.r0”; for the example above, the CRL file is “1d879c6c.r0”.

4. If some non-default values are found at points 1-3, add the relevant parameters in the sec.protocol directive of the configuration file.
2.5.1.4.2 Client side

The default settings should be adequate for most of the use cases. Exceptions to the rule may be the location of the CA certificates and related CRLs, and the strength of the requirement about CRLs.

The following **environment variables** are provided to change the defaults on the client side:

**XrdSecDEBUG**

verbose level; the level can be set to 1 (low), 2 (medium) or 3 (high or dump). Default is 0.

**XrdSecGSIUSERCERT** or **X509_USER_CERT**

alternative full path to the file containing the certificate to be used by the client; the path can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; ‘~’ /’ is expanded to $HOME. Default: $HOME/.globus/usercert.pem

**XrdSecGSIUSERKEY** or **X509_USER_KEY**

alternative full path to the file containing the private key associated with client certificate; the path can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; ‘~’ /’ is expanded to $HOME. Default: $HOME/.globus/userkey.pem

**XrdSecGSIUSERPROXY** or **X509_USER_PROXY**

alternative full path to the file containing the user proxy certificate to be used by the client; the path can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; ‘~’ /’ is expanded to $HOME. Default /tmp/x509up_uuid

**XrdSecGSIPROXYVALID**

validity of the proxy certificate; *formst* is in the form “hh:mm”. Default is “12:00”, i.e. 12 hours.

**XrdSecGSIPROXYKEYBITS**

bit strength of the proxy PKI. Default is 512.

**XrdSecGSIPROXYDEPLEN**

number of children generations which can originate from this proxy and controls delegation extent. Use -1 for infinite. Default is 0.
**XrdSecGSICADIR or X509_CERT_DIR**

alternative full path to the directory containing the CA certificates; the path can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; ‘~/’ is expanded to $HOME. Default: /etc/grid-security/certificates

**XrdSecGSICRLDIR or X509_CERT_DIR**

alternative full path to the directory containing the files with CRL information for CAs; the path can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; ‘~/’ is expanded to $HOME. Default: /etc/grid-security/certificates

**XrdSecGSICACHECK** (defines CA verification level):

- 0 do not verify;
- 1 verify if self-signed, issuing a warning if not;
- 2 always verify the CAs in the chain, failing if not possible.

Default is 1.

**XrdSecGSICRLCHECK** (type of check to be performed on CRLs):

- 0 do not care; ignore any CRL information for the CA being used for certificate chain verification;
- 1 use CRL if available (if the CRL certificate is missing for a given CA, the related CRL is assumed to be empty);
- 2 require CRL for any trusted CA, but do not stop if the CRL certificate is not up-to-date;
- 12 require CRL for any trusted CA, and attempt to download the CRL certificate if the file is not found or is not up-to-date;
- 3 require an up-to-date CRL for each CA;

Default is 1.

**XrdSecGSICRLEDIR**

alternative full path to the directory containing the CRL certificates; the path can be absolute or relative to the place where the daemon is started; ‘~/’ is expanded to $HOME. Default is the same as for CA certificates.

**XrdSecGSICRLEXT**

alternative default extension for CRL certificate files. Default is “.r0”.
XrdSecGSIDELEGPROXY (defines behavior with respect to proxy delegation):
  0  do nothing (i.e. delegation is disabled).
  1  sign the proxy certificate supplied by the server to enable delegation.
  2  send the local proxy certificate to the server (this includes proxy private key).
      Default is 0.

XrdSecGSISRVNAMES
   Define valid CNs for the server certificates; default is null, which means that
   the server CN must be in the form "*/<hostname>". The string may contain
   multiple format specifications separated by a '|'. Each specifications can
   contain the <host> or <fqdn> placeholders which are replaced by
   XrdSecEntity.host; they can also contain the '*' wildcard. A '-' before the
   specification will deny the matching CN's; the last matching wins.

XrdSecGSITRUSTDNS (controls hostname validation):
  0  do not use DNS to aide in certificate hostname validation.
  1  use DNS, if needed, to validate certificate hostnames.
      Default is 0.
2.5.1.5  xrdgsiproxy

```
xrdgsiproxy [mode] [-bits bits] [-cert file]
        [-certdir dir] [-debug] [-f file] [-key file]
        [-out file] [-path-length len] [-valid valid]
```

Function
Stand-alone application to browse, create or destroy a user proxy certificate.

Parameters
mode  Specifies the operation mode:
    info    display content of the proxy certificate;
    init    create a proxy certificate;
    destroy destroy existing proxy certificate.
    Default is info.

bits bits  Bit strength of the proxy PKI. Default is 512.

certdir dir  Alternate directory path for trusted Certificate Authority certificates. Default:
/etc/grid-security/certificates

cert file  Alternate path for the user certificate file.
    Default: $HOME/.globus/usercert.pem

debug  Run in verbose mode.

f file, out file  Alternate location of the proxy file. Default: /tmp/x509up_uuid

key file  Alternate path for the file containing the private key associated with the user certificate. Default: $HOME/.globus/userkey.pem
**path-length** *len*

Number of child generations which can originate from this proxy (i.e., control delegation). Use -1 for infinite. Default is 0.

**valid** *valid*

Validity of the proxy certificate. Default is **12:00**, i.e. 12 hours.
2.5.2 host protocol

```
sec.protocol host
```

**Function**
Enable host protocol to be used.

**Defaults**
Even though the host protocol is built-in; it will not be used unless specified with a `protocol` directive.

**Notes**
1) Because `host` protocol is the least restrictive authentication mechanism; allowing its unbound use (see the `protbind` directive) makes all other protocols superfluous. A warning message is issued if you define the host protocol but do not restrict its use to certain hosts.

2) **Warning**: `host` protocol does not provide any significant level of security and should only be used in instances where security violations do not matter.

**Example**
```
sec.protocol host
```
2.5.3 krb5 protocol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Define the characteristics of the krb5 authentication protocol.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>libpath</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The absolute directory path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader or the <strong>LD_LIBRARY_PATH</strong> environmental variable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **kfn** |
| The full pathname to the file that contains encryption and decryption keys for the protocol. The default keyfile name is protocol dependent. |

| **-ipchk** |
| Verifies that credentials are always presented from the same host that actually obtained the credentials. |

| **sid** |
| The service principal name used for authentication. |

| Defaults |
| The keyfile location is defined by Kerberos V to be /etc/v5srvtab. IP checking is disabled (i.e., the host that obtained credentials need not be the same as the one that supplies the credentials). |

| Notes |
| 1) The **noipcheck** option is provided for AFS Kerberos support (i.e., you must specify **noipcheck** when using AFS kerberos) as well as support for installations that wish to forward tickets from host to host. |

| Example |
| sec.protocol krb5 /etc/krb5keys xrdserv |
2.5.3.1 Configuring Kerberos V Security

Follow these steps to configure Kerberos V protocol for xrootd:

1. Create a principal in the Kerberos authentication database. This principal will be the xrootd “service name”. While the default is to create a different instance\(^1\) of the principal for every machine on which xrootd runs, it is much easier to create a single instance for all machines, especially if you have many machines.

2. Install a keytab file containing the principal’s key string. The keytab file may be generated by using kadmin\(^2\) command in Unix and the Ktpass command in Windows, as follows:

   Unix:
   \[
   \text{ktadd} \ -k \ \text{filename principal}
   \]

   Windows:
   \[
   \text{Ktpass} \ -princ \ \text{principal} \ -pass \ \text{pswd} \ -out \ \text{filename}
   \]

   Substitute for filename the name of the keytab file you wish to create or the name of an existing keytab file to which you wish to add a key. For principal, substitute the name of the principal you created in the previous step. Consult the man pages on kadmin and Ktpass for more information.

1. Place the srvtab file in a secure location on each server.

2. In the xrootd configuration file code the protocol directive using the location of the srvtab file and the service name principal, as previously described.

3. If you are using Kerberos V with AFS, make sure to not specify the -ipchk protocol directive option since AFS does not handle ticket IP addresses.

---

\(^1\) Kerberos V service principals are of the form “name/hostname”.

\(^2\) The command requires the “inquire” administrative privilege.
2.5.4  pwd protocol

```
                  [-vc:level] [-syspwd] [-maxfail:num]
                  [-lf: lifetime] [-a:option] [-c:list]
                  [-upwd:option] [-udir:dir]
                  [-cryptfile:file]
```

**Function**

Define the characteristics of the **pwd** authentication protocol.

**Parameters**

**libpath**

The absolute directory path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader or the **LD_LIBRARY_PATH** environmental variable.

**d:level**

Sets the verbosity level for this module to *level*; the level can be set to 1 (low), 2 (medium) or 3 (high or dump). Invoking xrotd with the verbose option –d sets the internal verbosity for this module to 1. Default is 0.

**dir:dir**

Specifies the directory path where to look for the password file; if this directive is missing, the password file is searched for under **$HOME/.xrd**; the alternative directory path can be either absolute (begins with ‘/’), relative to **$HOME** (begins with ‘~’), or relative to directory where the daemon is started.

Examples:

- `-dir:/etc/xrd`
  make use of /etc/xrd/pwdadmin as password file
- `-dir:~/local/xrd`
  make use of $HOME/local/xrd/pwdadmin as password file
- `-dir:xrd`
  make use of $PWD/xrd/pwdadmin as password file
vc:level

Specifies the level of verification of client identity:

0   no additional check is done; the exchanged information packet could potentially be re-used for a reply attack.
1   verify timestamp signature; this limits the time window for reply attacks to 5 min.
2   verify random nonce signature; this choice eliminates the risk of reply attacks; it requires an additional exchange.

Default is 2.

syspwd

Instructs the server to check also the system password file; the right privileges must be owned by the server to be able to do this operation.

maxfail:num

Specifies the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts allowed before the related user tag is blocked. Option disabled by default.

lf: lifetime

Specifies the lifetime of the current password; when a time interval longer than this value is elapsed from the last the password change, the user is asked to change its password at next login. The format is

"<years>y:<days>d:<hours>h:<minutes>m:<seconds>s"

e.g. “1y:182d:12h” for one year and a half. Lifetime is infinite by default.

a:option

Specify the set of users allowed to auto-register. Possible choices

0   none
1   users with an account on the machine (according to getpwnam) or with an enabled entry in the password file;
2   everybody.

Default is 0.
c:list
Specifies the list of supported cryptographic modules; the default is
’ssl|local’, with ‘ssl’ indicating the module based on OpenSSL, and ‘local’ an
implementation of cipher-related functionality written by A. Pukall
(http://membres.lycos.fr/pc1/) and provided for backup in the case OpenSSL is
not available.

upwd:option
Specify whether the server should also consider password files provided by
users having an account on the server node; possible choices:

0  ignore user password files
1  use user password file $USERHOME/.xrd/pwduser, where
   $USERHOME is the user home directory as returned by
   getpwnam; the default subdirectory .xrd can be changed with –
   udir (see below).
2  check also password files with crypt-like password hashes; the
default name for the file is $USERHOME/.xrdpass and can be
changed with –cryptfile (see below). This option is provided
mostly for backward compatibility with ROOT daemons.

Default is 0.

udir:dir
Specify alternative user sub-directory for the user password file; if existing,
the file read is “$HOMEUSER/dir/pwduser”. Default: .xrd.

cryptfile:file
Specify alternative name for file with crypt-like password hash when option -
upwd:2 has been specified. Default: .xrdpass

Defaults
See description of each single parameter.

Example
sec.protocol pwd -a:1
2.5.4.1 Configuring pwd Security

2.5.4.1.1 Server side
Follow these steps to configure the password-based protocol for xrootd:

1. Create a password file. To create the file in the default location ($HOME/.xrd/pwdadmin) just run `xrdpwdadmin` (see below). Add a contact e-mail and the host name with

   ```
   xrdpwdadmin add -host FQDN -email e.mail@my.domain
   ```

2. Add entries for the users, e.g.

   ```
   xrdpwdadmin add usertag
   ```

   The file `$HOME/.xrd/genpwd/usertag` is created: it contains information about the temporary password and the public cipher initiators of the server. This file should be sent in a secure way to the user for which `usertag` has been created.

3. Users with an account on the system may be allowed by the server administrator to define their own password file, a sort of auto-registration. Option `-upwd:1` enables this feature. A user-password file (default coordinates `$HOME/.xrd/pwduser`) can be created in the same way as the main password file, changing the mode with `-m user`; only entries tagged with `-m user`; only entries tagged with the file owner username are processed.

2.5.4.1.2 Client side

There are two files relevant for the client: the auto-login file (default `$HOME/.xrd/pwdnetrc`) and the file with the server cipher public initiators (default `$HOME/.xrd/pwdsrvpuk`). These files are created automatically by the code initializing the client. However, the user can browse and modify them with `xrdpwdadmin`. In particular, when the client receives the file `pwdfile` with password and cipher information, it can import the content as follows

   ```
   xrdpwdadmin -m srvpuk -import pwdfile
   xrdpwdadmin -m netrc update -import pwdfile
   ```
By default auto-login is switched-off. It can be switched using the appropriate environment variable (see below). The auto-login system understands any ‘*’ as a wild character. A valid entry applying to a set of host of similar name can be copied into an entry with a wild char using copy; for example, after

```
xrdpwdadmin –m netrc copy usertag@lxplus076.cern.ch usertag@lxplus*
```

the password associated with usertag@lxplus* will be used for a first login attempt to any machine of the LXPLUS cluster (depending on the shell, the ‘*’ may need to be escaped in the above copy command).

Clients can require at any moment a password change by prefixing the password with the string $changepwd$, e.g. if the current password for usertag is curpwd, and the string “$changepwd$curpwd” is entered at password prompt, the client will be prompted again for the new password.

The following environment variables are provided to change the defaults on the client side:

- **XrdSecDEBUG** – verbose level; the level can be set to 1 (low), 2 (medium) or 3 (high or dump). Default is 0.
- **XrdSecPWDAUTOLOG** – switch ON (=1) or OFF (=0) use of autologin information; default is 0 (OFF).
- **XrdSecPWAUTOLOGFILE** – full path to the file with autologin information. Default: $HOME/.xrd/pwdauto
- **XrdSecPWDDERIVEDS** – switch ON (=1) or OFF (=0) verification of server identity; verification requires the signature of a random nonce, which implies an additional exchange. Default is 1 (ON).
- **XrdSecPWSRVPUK** – full path to the file with server cipher initiators. Default: $HOME/.xrd/pwpsrvuk
2.5.4.2 xrdpwdadmin

```
xrdpwdadmin [-m mode] action [tag] [newtag] [-f file]
[-force] [-crypto list]
[-import file]
[-host name] [-email mail]
[-iternum num] [-changepwd]
```

Function

Stand-alone application to browse, create or modify password and auto-login files.

Parameters

`mode` specifies the operation mode:
- `admin` manage a general password file (server side);
- `user` manage user-specific password file (server side);
- `netrc` manage an auto-login file (client side);
- `srvpuk` manage a file with public cipher initiators (client side).
Default is `admin`.

`action` specifies the action to be performed on the file:
- `add` add new entry; requires specification of `tag`
- `update` update information about an entry; requires specification of `tag`
- `remove` remove all information about a tag; requires specification of `tag`
- `disable` disable logins for a given tag; requires specification of `tag`
- `copy` create a new tag as exact copy of an existing tag; requires specification of `tag` and `newtag`
- `browse` browse the content of the file
- `trim` eliminate obsolete / not-reachable information after a remove
Default is `browse`.

`tag`, `newtag`

String of characters of any length identifying a set of entries in the password file.

`f file` specifies an alternative path for the file to manage/create.
[no]passwd
[add, update only] Controls whether a password should be assigned to the entry or not; by default a password is assigned; if –nopasswd is specified, the entry is just activated and, if auto-registration is allowed, the user will be asked to set a password the first time she logs in.

[no]random
[add, update only] Controls randomness of a password; by default the new password is a random string of 8 printable chars; if –norandom is specified, the caller is prompted for a password; in update mode, a check is done to ensure that the new password is different from the current one.

[no]change
[add, update only] Controls type of password; by default the new password is a one-time only password to be changed upon first use; if –nochange is specified, the password type is directly set to normal.

import file
[netrc, srvpuk only] Import information from the file received by the administrator of the password file.

changepwd
[netrc only] Set password status to one-time-only so that at next login a password change handshake is triggered.

host hostname
[admin, user only] Add a special entry with the host name to the password file.

e-mail
[admin, user only] Add a special entry with a contact e-mail to the password file.

iternum num
[admin, user only] Number of iterations to be used in hashing within the key derivation function. This is the main factor limiting time performance. Default is 10000 (J. Viega, M. Messier, Secure Programming Cookbook, p. 141).
crypto list
List of cryptographic modules (separated by a vertical bar) to be used if available. Default is 'ssl|local'.

force
Forces execution of the requested action even if it modifies existing information. When used together with add, it is equivalent to update.
2.5.5 sss protocol

```
sec.protocol [ libpath ] sss [options]
```

**options:**

```
[{-c | --clientkt} cktpath]
[{-e | --encrypt} etype]
[{-g | --getcreds}]
[{-l | --lifetime} lifetime]
[{-k | --keyname}]
[{-p | --proxy} protmap]
[{-r | --refresh} refresh]
[{-s | --serverkt} sktpath]
```

**Function**

Define the characteristics of the simple shared secret (sss) authentication protocol.

**Parameters**

*libpath*

is the absolute directory path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader or the `LD_LIBRARY_PATH` environmental variable.

*{-c | --clientkt} cktpath*

is the absolute file-path to the client’s key table. The key table file must only be readable by the username under which the client is running, or group readable if the file name ends with “.grp”. This is provided as a hint to the client and may be over-ridden (see the notes).

*{-e | --encrypt} etype*

is the encryption type to be used when transmitting secret information. Valid types are:

- `bf32`  Blowfish encryption with CRC32 message validation (the default).

*{-g | --getcreds}*

retrieves the original credentials from the client, if applicable. See the notes on why you would want to specify this option.
{-k | --keyname} 
uses the name of the key and key’s identifier used by the client to find the key 
in the server’s key table. The default is to only use the key identifier. See the 
notes on why this is the default and why you may want to specify this option.

{-l | --lifetime} lifetime 
is the maximum lifetime of any encrypted message sent between the client 
and server. Messages older than the specified number of seconds are rejected. 
The default is 13 seconds.

{-p | --proxy} protmap 
specifies the authentication protocols that the sss protocol may assume (i.e. 
proxy). Specify for protmap a colon separated list of protocol names. See the 
section on proxy authentication for more information. The default does not 
allow proxy authentication.

{-r | --refresh} refresh 
is the key table file refresh interval. The server checks every refresh minutes if 
minimum refresh value is 10 minutes. The default is 60 minutes.

{-s | --serverkt} sktpath 
is the absolute file-path to the server’s key table. The key table file must only 
be readable by the username under which the server is running or group 
readable if the file name ends with “.grp”. The default is “$HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab”.

Defaults 
See description of each single parameter.

Notes
1) Default locations exist for client- and server-side key table files. This is 
“$HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab”. Use the --c option to over-ride the default for 
the client and the --s option to over-ride the default for the server. Note 
that the client may specify a fixed location for the key table file 
irrespective of any explicit or implicit default.

2) The --lifetime option controls how long an encrypted message may 
remain valid. This minimizes replay attacks. However, if server or client 
response times are slower than the lifetime of the message, the parties will 
not be able to authenticate. In this case, you should specify a larger time.
3) The `getcreds` option requests that the client supply the original credentials that were issued for a previous authentication. This only applies to proxy servers who are acting on behalf of a client. Normally, credentials are not transmitted because they are unusable by a second party unless they have been delegated. However, should they be delegated, transmitting them to a third party may pose a security risk. You should not specify this option unless it is essential to do so. The client, nonetheless, is free to ignore this request.

4) The `keyname` option qualifies the key lookup with the `keyname` used by the client. By default, lookups are done only by `keyid`. However, it is possible that the same `keyid` may appear under two different `keynames` should they be added to the key table on different hosts or very close together on the same host. The `keyname` option addresses this problem. The reason that it is not the default is strictly for backward compatibility as many sites have solved this problem in ways that may be incompatible with a `keyname-keyid` lookup.

5) The `getcreds` and `keyname` options appeared in Release 5. Older clients do not support these options. Older clients never send credentials and the server always reverts to `keyid` lookups for older clients.

6) The `xrdssadmin` command is used to create and maintain key tables that contain simple shared secrets. The command also is used to specify how shared secrets map to authenticated user and group names.

7) An “sss” authenticated client can set its identity using an instance of an object in the `XrdSecsssID` class. See the comments in `XrdSecsssID.hh` source file for detailed information.

Example

```
sec.protocol sss -r 30 -s /opt/xrootd/.xrd/sss.keytab
```
2.5.5.1 Proxy Authentication

The Release 5 version of the sss protocol is capable of proxying any credential that may have been issued to a client. For instance, assume client A authenticates to server X using gsi protocol then server X authenticates with server Y using sss it may do so using client A’s credentials. The sss protocol, if allowed, recreates the authentication context on server Y so that it appears that the server is actually communicating with client A.

Since proxing security protocol identities comes with its own set of risks, it must be explicitly enabled as follows:

a) The original protocol used by the client must appear in the list of allowable protocols specified by the \texttt{--authmap} option,

b) The username assigned to the key used to encrypt communications must be \texttt{"allusers"}. This allows you to selectively restrict proxying by key; and

c) The client must supply a username and its original trace identity.

Original credentials, if requested by the server (i.e. \texttt{--getcreds} option), are honored by the client only if mutual authentication occurs and the key being used is assigned the username \texttt{"allusers"}.

When proxying is not possible, the server reverts to identifying the protocol used as sss and applies the key restrictions to the formulated identity. Otherwise, the protocol is identified as the original one used by the client.
2.5.5.2 Configuring sss Security

2.5.5.2.1 Server side

For very simple\(^3\) installations, follow these steps to configure the sss protocol for \texttt{xrootd}:  

1. Create a key table file. To create the file in the default location ($HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab) just run \texttt{xrdssadmin} (see below\(^4\)) under the same username that will be used for \texttt{xrootd}: 
   
   \texttt{xrdssadmin add}

2. Distribute the key table file to the hosts that need to share the secret in the key table file. You can use a combination of \texttt{ssh} and \texttt{xrdssadmin} to securely do this. For example, executing the following under the same username that will be used for \texttt{xrootd}

   \texttt{cat $HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab | ssh user@host xrdssadmin install}

   where \texttt{user} is the username that will be used to run the client application on node \texttt{host}. This will create the file $HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab on the machine named \texttt{host} only readable by \texttt{user}.

2.5.5.2.2 Client side

The only file that the client needs is the key table file. This should have been distributed using the procedure outlined in the previous section. Two environmental variables control client-side execution:

\texttt{XrdSecDEBUG} \quad \text{debug level; the level can be set to 1 (on). Default is 0.}

\texttt{XrdSecSSSKT} \quad \text{holds the location of the key table file. When set, the key table must exist as specified in the environmental variable. When not set, the default is provided by the server initiating the authentication protocol. If the server does not provide a default or if the key table is not found there, $HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab becomes the default.}

\(^3\) For more complicated installations refer to the \texttt{xrdssadmin} command.

\(^4\) For more complicated installations, see the description of the \texttt{xrdssadmin} command.
2.5.5.3 xrdssadmin

```
xrdssadmin [options] action [ keyfn[.grp] ]
```

**action:** add | del | install | list

**options:**
- `-d`
- `-g group`
- `-h hold`
- `-k keyname[+]
- `-l keylen`
- `-n keynum`
- `-s {c|g|k|n|u|x}`
- `-u user`
- `-x {days | mm/dd/yy}`

**Function**
Stand-alone application to browse, create or modify the key table for the sss protocol.

**Parameters**
keyfn[.grp]
is the name of the key table file which is the target of the action. If the name ends with .grp then the file is allowed to have group access read-mode bits set. Otherwise, the file may only be read and written by the owner. If keyfn is not specified, $HOME/.xrd/sss.keytab is used. See the notes for details.

**add** adds a new key to the key table. The new key may be assigned an optional keyname, group, and user; with defaults of anywhere, nogroup, and nobody, respectively.

**del** deletes an existing key from the key table. Only keys matching -g, -k, -n, and -u options, as specified, are deleted.

**install** creates or replaces an existing key table. Only keys matching -g, -k, -n, and -u options, as specified, are installed. The key table is read from standard in; making the command suitable for use with ssh to provide a secure in-place update of a key table on a remote host.

**list** displays the contents of the key table. Only keys matching -g, -k, -n, and -u options, as specified, are displayed.
-d turns on debugging output.

-g group
specifies an optional group name. The resulting effect is dependent on the action. See the notes for a detailed explanation.

-h hold is the maximum number of keys with the same keyname that are to be held in the key table file. The default hold value is 3. See the notes for more information.

-k keyname[+]
specifies an optional key name. The resulting effect is dependent on the action. If the keyname ends with a plus sign (+), sss tokens may be forwarded when encrypted by the associated key. Warning: forward-able sss tokens are inherently less secure. See the notes for a detailed explanation.

-l keylen
is the byte-length of key to be added to the key table file via the add action. The default key length is 32 bytes (i.e., 256 bits). The keylen value should be between 4 and 128, inclusive. Otherwise, it is set to the minimum (maximum) value, as appropriate.

-n keynum
specifies an optional key number. The resulting effect is dependent on the action. See the notes for a detailed explanation.

-s {c | g | k | n | u | x}
sorts the output of the list action in ascending order as follows:
c - by creation date k - by key name u - by user name
g - by group name n - by key number x - by expiration date

-u user specifies an optional user name. The resulting effect is dependent on the action. See the notes for a detailed explanation.

-x days is the number of days that the key is to be valid. Specifying 0, the default, will never expire the key.

-x mm/dd/yy
is the date at which the key is to expire.
Notes

1) The `-g`, `-k`, `-n` and `-u` options modify the effects of the specified action. For `del`, `install`, and `list` actions, these options are used to narrow the set of keys to which the action applies. That is, only keys matching the specified options are deleted, installed, or listed.

2) For the `add` action, the `-g`, `-k`, and `-u` options are used to associated a group name, key name, and user name with the key. The following table lists the default names and special names.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Default Name</th>
<th>Special Names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-g</td>
<td>nogroup</td>
<td>anygroup, usrgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-u</td>
<td>nobody</td>
<td>anybody, allusers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

anygroup
allows the client using the key to specify\(^5\) the actual group name. If the client omits the specification, the default name is used.

usrgroup
always sets the group list to null. This defers setting the user’s groups until authorization time\(^6\).

anybody
allows the client using the key to specify\(^7\) the actual user name. If the client omits the specification, the default name is used.

allusers
allows the original security protocol used by the client to be proxied by the server. Special group names are ignored if proxing the user’s identity is successful. See the section on proxy authentication.

3) Specifying any name other than a special name, prohibits the client from over-riding the name. The authenticated name is set to the specified name when the client successfully uses the associated key.

4) **Warning:** using special names *require* that you trust the client to specify a proper name. Special names do not confer any additional security.

---

\(^5\) The client does this as specified in the *XrdSecsssID.hh* file.

\(^6\) The default authorization described in this reference uses the “userid” to look-up the associated groups as defined by Unix.

\(^7\) The client does this as specified in the *XrdSecsssID.hh* file.
5) When the keyname ends with a plus sign, an sss token encrypted by the associated key may be forwarded (i.e. used by a host different from the one that encrypted the sss token). **Warning:** Allowing forwarded tokens makes it impossible to detect man-in-the-middle attacks or stolen sss tokens. To maintain a high level of security, you should avoid making sss tokens forwardable whenever possible.

6) You need to make sss tokens forwardable for certain clients. For instance, clients who reside on a private network and tunnel through a Network Address Translation (NAT) device cannot use non-forwardable sss tokens. This is because the NAT device appears as a man-in-the-middle attacker to the sss protocol and the client’s sss token will be rejected. Forwardable sss tokens avoid this problem.

7) For simple installations, you need not assign keys names. For more secure installations, you can use the keyname to easily install designated keys on designated hosts; limiting your exposure to intrusions. For instance,

```
xrdssssadmin -k io.slac.stanford.edu add /opt/xrootd/mytab
xrdssssadmin -k foo.harvard.edu add /opt/xrootd/mytab
```

adds two keys to file `/opt/xrootd/mytab`, each with a unique name that corresponds to the host that should receive that key. You can now easily distribute the desired keys to each host by executing one of the following

```
grep io.slac.stanford.edu /opt/xrootd/mytab  \
| ssh u1@io.slac.stanford.edu  \
xrdssssadmin install /opt/xrootd/mytab

egrep 'foo.harvard.edu|io.slac.stanford.edu' /opt/xrootd/mytab  \
| ssh u1@border.slac.stanford.edu  \
xrdssssadmin install /opt/xrootd/mytab
```
2.5.6  unix protocol

```
sec.protocol [ libpath ] unix
```

**Function**

Define the characteristics of the `unix` authentication protocol.

**Parameters**

```
libpath
```

The absolute directory path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader or the `LD_LIBRARY_PATH` environmental variable.

**Defaults**

None.

**Notes**

1) *Warning:* `unix` protocol does not provide any significant level of security and should only be used in instances where security violations do not matter.

**Example**

```
sec.protocol /usr/lib/xrd unix
```
2.5.7 ztn protocol

```
sec.protocol [ libpath ] ztn [ options ]

options: [-expiry {ignore | optional | require}]
[-maxsz toksz[k]] [-tokenlib tlpth]
```

Function
Define the characteristics of the ztn client validation protocol.

Parameters

libpath
The absolute directory path where the protocol shared library exists. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader or the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environmental variable.

-expiry
Specifies how token expiration is to be handled should the expiry check not be applied by the token validation library. Specify one of:
- ignore - token expiration should be ignored (not recommended).
- optional - if the token specifies an expiration time is must not have passed.
- require - the token must specify an expiration time and it must not have passed. This is the default.

-maxsz
The maximum size of a valid bearer token. Specify for toksz the size in bytes or kilobytes if suffixed by the letter k. The maximum allowable size is 512k. The default is 4k.

tlpth
The absolute path bearer token authorization shared library. If an absolute path is not specified, the library must be on the search path defined by the loader or the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environmental variable. The default is libXrdAccSciTokens.so.

Defaults
-expiry required -maxsz 4k -tokenlib libXrdAccSciTokens.so
Notes

1) The **ztn** client validation protocol is primarily meant to verify that a connecting client is capable of getting a valid unexpired bearer token from a recognized token issuer. Clients that cannot show such proof are rejected. This effectively screens out bad actors that try to anonymously probe the server’s capabilities.

2) The **ztn** client validation protocol requires that all communications occur over a **TLS** connection. When enabled, the server automatically requires that logins and all subsequent requests use **TLS**. This is enforced irrespective of any other enabled authentication protocol even if such protocols do not require **TLS**.

3) The **ztn** protocol records the token’s subject value as the name of the incoming client. If the subject is missing (which normally results in authorization failure), the client’s name becomes “**anon**”.

4) The **-expiry none** option is only used should the expiry check in the token library not be applied. Normally, all tokens are required to have an expiration time.

5) The **ztn** protocol returns failure if the corresponding token authorization plug-in has not been enabled using the **ofs.authlib** directive.

6) See the [following section](#) on details of the token discovery mechanism.

Example

```
sec.protocol ztn -maxsz 8k
```
2.5.7.1 Default token discovery mechanism and augmentation

When the server requests \texttt{ztn} to be applied and the default mechanism is not disabled the following actions occur either before or after augmentation.

1. If the \texttt{BEARER_TOKEN} environment variable is set, then the value is taken to be the token contents.

2. If the \texttt{BEARER_TOKEN_FILE} environment variable is set, then its value is interpreted as a filename. If the file exists, the contents of the specified file are taken to be the token contents.

3. If the \texttt{XDG_RUNTIME_DIR} environment variable is set, then take the token from the contents of \texttt{$XDG\_RUNTIME\_DIR/bt\_u\_uid} (where \texttt{euid} is the user’s effective \texttt{uid}). If the file exists, the contents of the file are taken to be the token contents.

4. Otherwise, if the file \texttt{/tmp/bt\_u\_uid} (where \texttt{euid} is the user’s effective \texttt{uid}) exists, the contents of the file are taken to be the token contents.

5. The token is deemed to not exist and unless there is post augmentation, \texttt{ztn} validation fails.

In all cases the following processing rules also apply:

1. When a non-null token value is found, all whitespace on the left and right sides of the value are stripped (whitespace is defined the same way as the \texttt{C99 isspace()} function defines whitespace).

2. If after stripping the whitespace the result is null, the token is deemed to not exist and the search for the token continues with the next step.

3. If after stripping the whitespace a value remains, it is taken as the token even if it is invalid. This token value is used and all subsequent steps are ignored. Since the \texttt{ztn} protocol generates a server-side error when an invalid token is processed and is reflected to the client, this arrangement still conforms to RFC6750.

In addition to the above, the client’s \texttt{ztn} protocol verifies that the file containing the token is only readable and writable by the owner of the file. If this check fails, the token is not returned.
2.6 protparm

```
sec.protparm pid parms
```

**Function**
Specify protocol parameters.

**Parameters**
- **pid** The identifier of a yet-to-be-defined protocol with the `protocol` directive.
- **parms** The parameters required by the protocol to operate successfully. The parameters are protocol dependent.

**Defaults**
See each protocol for its specific set of default parameters.

**Notes**
1) The `protparm` directive allows you to conveniently specify very long parameter strings. The final parameters are constructed in the order specified; with each specification (i.e., `parms`) separated by a new-line (`\n`) character. The first parameter string comes from the `parms` specification on the `protocol` directive.
2) The specified `pid` must not have been yet defined using the protocol directive.
3) Each specified `pid` must have a matching `protocol` directive following the last occurrence of `protparm pid`.

**Example**
```
sec.protparm krb5 /etc/krb5keys xrdserv
```
3 Default Authorization Configuration

3.1 audit

```
acc.audit parm [ parm ]
parm: deny | grant | none
```

**Function**
Control the level of auditing.

**Parameters**

*parm* The level of auditing specify one or more of:
- **deny** - audit access denials
- **grant** - audit access approvals
- **none** - turn off auditing

**Defaults**
```
acc.audit none
```

**Notes**
1) Audit parameters are cumulative. To enabled auditing of denials and approvals you must specify both **deny** and **grant** parameters.
2) The **none** parameter turns off auditing regardless of what was specified prior to the **none** parameter.
3) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

**Example**
```
acc.audit deny
```
3.2 authdb

```
acc.authdb path
```

Function
Specify the location of the authorization database.

Parameters

- **path**
  The absolute path of the authorization database.

Defaults

```
acc.authdb /opt/xrd/etc/Authfile
```

Notes

1) You *must* specify the `authdb` directive together with the `ofs.authorize` directive in order to enable authorization.

2) The meaning of the specification depends on the mechanism used to obtain authorization information. The default implementation uses a flat file. You specify the name of this flat file using the `authdb` directive.

3) In order to maintain proper security, the authorization file must only be writable by the user running as `xrootd`. Some installation may also wish to restrict read access to the same user.

4) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

Example

```
acc.authdb /opt/xrd/etc/AuthDB
```
3.3 authrefresh

Function
Control how frequently the authorization database is to be checked for modifications.

Parameters
seconds
The number seconds between checks for modifications.

Defaults
acc.authrefresh 43200

Notes
1) The acc component periodically checks to see if the authorization database has changed. If it has changed, xrootd rebuilds internal authorization information from the database. This means that the authrefresh directive determines the information currency.
2) Lower authrefresh seconds values increase xrootd overhead because internal information may need to be rebuilt more frequently.
3) Higher authrefresh seconds values decrease xrootd overhead. However, authorization information may be out of date for an excessively long period of time.
4) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

Example
acc.authrefresh 10800
3.4 encoding

```
acc.encoding args
args: [pct path] [space char]
```

Function
Specify the encoding of access control targets.

Parameters

- **pct**
  Specifies that the arguments are percent-encoded (a.k.a. url-encoded).
  Currently, the only target that may be percent-encoded is the path, which
  must be specified as an argument.

- **space**
  Specifies that the id’s may be encoded with a character, char, that should be
  converted to a space. The ids that may be encoded with a space character are:
  group, organization, role, and user. Specify for char a single character that
  should be converted to a space in any of the aforementioned ids.

Defaults
None, no encoding is recognized.

Notes
1) The pct encoding is most useful for specifying imbedded spaces in a path
   using the standard %20 sequence. When enabled all paths are percent-
   decoded before being used for authorization.
2) When a space character is specified, all relevant id’s are scanned for this
   character and each occurrence is replaced by a space before the id is used
   for authorization purposes.

Example
```
acc.encoding pct path space ^
```
3.5 gidllifetime

| acc.gidllifetime seconds |

**Function**
Controls how long group membership information may be cached in memory.

**Parameters**

- **seconds**
  The number of seconds group membership information may be cached before it must be discarded and subsequently re-determined, as needed. The value may be suffixed by `s`, `h`, or `m` (the case is immaterial) to indicate that seconds (the default), minutes, or hours are being specified, respectively.

**Defaults**
acc.gidllifetime 12h

**Notes**

1) Because it is relatively expensive to determine a user’s groups, `xrootd` caches the information in memory for a limited time so that subsequent requests for the user’s group memberships can be quickly satisfied. Since the user’s groups may change, the information is cached for a limited time. After the time interval expires, the membership information is discarded so that the next request for the user’s groups will cause the information to be recomputed.

2) Lower `gidllifetime seconds` values increase `xrootd` overhead because group membership information may need to be rebuilt more frequently.

3) Higher `gidllifetime seconds` values decrease `xrootd` overhead. However, group membership information may be out of date for an excessively long period of time.

4) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

**Example**
acc.gidllifetime 4h
3.6 gidretran

```
acc.gidretran gid [ gid [ . . . ] ]
```

**Function**

Specify the Unix group ids that are aliases. See the notes on when to use this directive.

**Parameters**

`gid` A Unix group number that is an alias for some other group number.

**Defaults**

None.

**Notes**

1) The `gidretran` directive may be used by large installations running NIS\(^8\) to disambiguate group names. Large installations may have a group membership list that is too large for a single group name entry. The typical solution is to break-up the membership list and assign it to two or more group names, each having the same group id number (`gid`). This leads to ambiguity as to which name should be used. The `gidretran` directive can record all such `gid`'s so that the authorization system knows when to retranslate a group name to its base name (e.g., the one shown via the `ls` command), as determined by the `getgrgid()` function.

2) Up to 128 group ids may be specified.

3) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

**Example**

```
acc.gidretran 10200 10201 10202
```

---

\(^8\) NIS+ does not have the problem described in this paragraph.
3.7 nisdomain

**acc.nisdomain name**

**Function**
Specify the domain name to use when determining membership in a NIS netgroup.

**Parameters**
- *name*  The NIS domain name to use.

**Defaults**
None. By default, a null domain name is used so that membership is solely determined based on the user’s name and the originating host name.

**Notes**
1) Membership in a NIS netgroup is determine by three factors:
   a. User’s originating host name,
   b. The user’s actual name, and
   c. An arbitrary domain name.
   The factors are commonly referred to as the (machine,user,domain) triple. The `innetgr()` function determines whether a triple is a member of a particular **netgroup**. When the domain name is not specified, then only the machine and user fields are used to determine membership in the a group, regardless of the domain specified in the NIS **netgroup** file.
2) Netgroup membership is only meaningful when the authorization database contains privileges based on **netgroup** name (i.e., n record type was specified).
3) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

**Example**

```plaintext
acc.nisdomain slacxrd
```
3.8 pgo

Function
Specify how Unix group membership affects authorization.

Parameters
None.

Defaults
All of the groups in which a user is a member determine the user’s privileges.

Notes
3) By default, all of a user’s Unix groups determine the user’s access privileges. This is the POSIX standard. Installations wishing SVR5 behavior should specify the pgo directive. When pgo is specified, only the user’s primary group determines the user’s privileges.
4) The pgo directive can substantially reduce xrootd overhead when many users have very long group membership lists.
5) This directive is used by the default authorization scheme. Other authorization schemes may or may not honor this directive.

Example
acc.pgo
4 Authorization Database File

Authorization information may come from various sources, depending on the installation. The supplied implementation uses a flat Unix file to record authorization information. Regardless of the information source, the following semantics prevail.

An authorization database contains one or more authorization records.
Each authorization record is considered to be a capability.
Each capability is tied to a unique identifier within its name class.

An identifier may be a
- host name,
- domain name,
- netgroup name,
- organization name,
- role name,
- template name,
- group name (e.g. Unix, VOMS, etc),
- user name

All template identifiers are logically processed in the order specified. The processing order of other identifiers is immaterial.

Each identifier is associated with an arbitrary list of path prefix-privilege pairs. The list is always searched from left to right (i.e., in the order that it was specified). The privileges associated with first prefix that matches an incoming path name are considered to be the applicable privileges.

Additionally, the flat file implementation allows for
- comments (i.e., any record whose first character is a pound sign, #),
- blank records, and
- continuations designated by a back slash (\) as the last non-blank character on the continued record.
4.1 Authorization Database Record Definition

```
idtype id { {path | \objectid} privs | tname } [ { {path | \objectid} privs | tname } [ ••• ] ]

idtype: g | h | n | o | r | s | t | u | x

privs: plets | -plets | plets-plets

plets: { a | d | i | k | l | n | r | w } [ plets ]
```

Where:

- **idtype**
  - is a single letter indicating the type of identifier that follows. Valid type letters are:
    - g - group name
    - h - host/domain name
    - n - netgroup name
    - o - organization name
    - r - role name
    - s - special inclusive
    - t - template name
    - u - user name
    - x - special exclusive

- **id**
  - The actual identifier. Identifier must be consistent with their type.
  - Additionally, host names must be fully qualified and specified in lower case.
  - Should a host name start with a period, it is treated as a domain name. A domain name must match the right-most characters of a host name in order for the associated capability to be used. An *id* can appear in only one rule.

- **\objectid**
  - The object identifier prefix to be used for matching purposes.

- **path**
  - The path prefix to be used for matching purposes.

- **privs**
  - The privileges associated with the preceding path. Privilege letters preceding a minus sign represent the privileges being granted. Privilege letters following the minus sign represent the privileges being denied. Privilege letters stand for:
    - a - all privileges
    - d - delete (i.e., remove) a file
    - i - insert (i.e., create) a file
    - k - lock a file (not used)
    - l - lookup a file (i.e., search directory)
    - n - rename a file
    - r - read a file
    - w - write a file
A previously defined (i.e., occurring earlier in the file) template name. The template’s associated path-privs list is logically substituted for the template name.

Notes

1) Any number of database records (i.e., lines terminated by a new line, \n character) may be specified.  
2) A database record may be continued to another record by placing a back slash (\) character at the end of the record (i.e., last non-blank character). Continuations are useful for long specifications since you are not allowed to specify the same id within a type more than once.  
3) Data records whose first character is a pound sign (#) are treated as comments.  
4) Blank database records are ignored.  
5) Only one particular idtype-id combination may appear in the authorization files. Therefore, you must specify all capabilities for an idtype-id in one record. Use continuation syntax to improve readability.  
6) The path-privs and objected-privs entries are always matched from left to right. Therefore, specify paths and objectids from most significant to least significant order (i.e., all exceptions or longest paths first)  
7) The authorization system does not perform multiple slash removal. Therefore a path prefix of /foo//bar and /foo/bar, while logically the same, are treated as two distinct specifications.  
8) While prefix matching does not differentiate file system objects, paths ending with a slash logically indicate a directory. This type of specification works consistently with all operations except “stat” and “list”. The reason is that these operations specify directory names without a trailing slash.  
9) In order to maintain a file system object view in a path prefix matching model, the look-up privilege should be granted to all users for all path prefixes.  
10) Certain privileges should be granted together. For instance, insert privileges should be granted along with delete privileges, and write with read.  
11) The user record type is also used to convey default privileges and specified referential privileges. Refer to the following sections for more information.  
12) Not all authentication methods convey all identities. For instance, gsi authentication may convey a role while unix authentication cannot.  
13) The s and x rules use special compound id. See the next section on how to use these rules.
Example

t base /fie l
u abh /fie/foo/fum/ a /fie/foo/ rw base

A template named base has been defined. It provides for look-up privileges to any file system object whose path starts with /fie. In this examples, it also implies that the contents of the fie directory can be listed. Subsequently, user abh is granted all permissions for file system objects that start with /fie/foo/fum/ (i.e., in directory fum), read-write permissions for all file system objects that start with /fie/foo/ (i.e., in directory foo) and whatever privileges that are afforded by template base.
### 4.1.1 Defining Special Compound ID’s for s and x rules

The authorization system allows you to define special identifiers that capture one or more identity components (e.g. name, group, role, organization, etc.). These id’s can be used to specify privileges granted to clients that match the compound identity using the s and x rules. This is shown below.

```plaintext
= id idspec [ idspec [ ••• ] ]

{s | x} id { {path | \objectid} privs | tname } [ { {path | \objectid} privs | tname } [ ••• ] ]

idspec: g groupname | h hostname | o orgname | r rolename | u username

privs: plets | -plets | plets-plets

plets: { a | d | i | k | l | n | r | w } [ plets ]
```

Where:

- **id**: an arbitrary but unique identifier. The identifier is associated with the subsequent client identity specification, *idspec*. The *id* can be used in a subsequent *s* or *x* rule and can only appear in one rule.

- **idspec**: is a single letter indicating the type of entity identifier that follows. You must specify one or more of them. Valid type specifications are:
  - *g* - group name
  - *o* - organization name
  - *u* - user name
  - *h* - host/domain name
  - *r* - role name

  Should a host name start with a period, it is treated as a domain name. A domain name must match the right-most characters of a host name. Any single letter entity identifier may only appear once in an *idspec* list. An *id* associated with the specified *idspec* is considered a match when all of the entity identifiers are true for a client (i.e. the whole *idspec* applies).

- **s**: specifies an inclusive capability for the *id*. Inclusive capabilities add and remove privileges granted by other matching rules.
x specifies an exclusive capability for the id. Exclusive capabilities determine privileges irrespective of other matching rules, as follows:
  o The system attempts to match the client’s identity against all x rules in the order that they appear in the authorization file.
  o The first matching rule establishes the client’s capabilities irrespective of any other rules that may apply to the client.

\objectid path privs tname
these are identical in meaning to those described in the previous section.

Notes
1) Since x rules are applied first and in the order that they appear in the authorization file with the first matching rule establishing capabilities, you should specify x rules in decreasing specificity.
2) The order in which you define special compound id’s is immaterial. However, an id must be defined before it is used.

Example

= atllddm  o atlas r production u ddm
= atlprod o atlas r production
x atllddm /atlas ld
x atlprod /atlas lrw
o atlas /atlas lr

A client whose name is ddm and is a member of the atlas organization and has a role of production is allowed to lookup and delete files in /atlas. A client who is a member of the atlas organization and has a role of production is allowed to lookup, read and write files in /atlas. Otherwise, client’s who are members of the atlas organization can only lookup and read file in /atlas.
4.1.2 Default Privileges

Default privileges may be specified using the user record type, as follows.

\[
\text{u} \ast \{ \text{path privs} \mid \text{tname} \} \{ \{ \text{path privs} \mid \text{tname} \} [ \cdots ] \}
\]

The use of an asterisk as the user name indicates that the specified privileges are to apply to all users, regardless of their user name and location (subject to other applicable negative privileges). The default specification is useful for granting all users look-up privileges on the complete file space in order to maintain a file system view of authorization.

4.1.3 User Fungible Capabilities

Privileges may be granted to specific paths that encode the user’s name without having to specify each such path for every user as follows:

\[
\text{u} = \{ \text{path privs} \mid \text{tname} \} \{ \{ \text{path privs} \mid \text{tname} \} [ \cdots ] \}
\]

Each path in UFC record should contain the character sequence “@=". The first such sequence indicates where the user’s name should be substituted before a path prefix match is attempted. This allows you to provide for file system areas that are effectively “owned” by a user without needing to specify the actual user’s name.

Example

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{u} \ast \text{xrd lr} \\
\text{u} &= \text{xrd/users/@=/ a}
\end{align*}
\]

All users, by default, have read and look-up access to any file system object prefixed by /xrd (i.e., in directory xrd). However, users have all privileges for any file system object that is prefixed by /xrd/users/, followed by their user name, and ending with a slash (i.e., in a directory that corresponds to their user name).
5 Document Change History

1 June 2005
- Add the generalized if facility explanation.

18 July 2005
- Include GIS and PWD protocol information. Supplied by Gerri Ganis, CERN.

22 March 2006
- Add exec condition to if/else/fi.

23 May 2006
- Discuss the authorization plug-in and the ofsd.authlib directive.

2 April 2007
- Move explanation of conditional directives to another manual.
- Some minor clean-up.

2 August 2007
- Add unix protocol description.
- Some minor clean-up.

8 January 2008
- General clean-up.

3 October 2008
- Add sss protocol description.

29 January 2009
- Add usrgroup option to the sss protocol.

7 April 2009
- Remove loginid option from the sss protocol.

25 November 2009
- Add ssl protocol description.

6 June 2011
- Make xrdssadmin example for distributing keys more obvious.
27 September 2011
- Remove description of the krb4 and ssl protocols.
- Fully describe all of the gsi security options.
- Describe the generic AuthzVO plug-in.

------------- Release 3.1.0

22 February 2012
- Add options 12 and 13 to “–crl:” to gsi security. Mentions these for envvar XrdSecGSICRLCHECK.
- Add the “–crlrefresh:” option to gsi security.

------------- Release 3.1.1

6 April 2012
- Correct type: change “validvo” to “valido” as the VOMS way of screening valid organizations in x.509 certificates.

------------- Release 3.2.0
------------- Release 3.2.1
------------- Release 3.2.2
------------- Release 3.2.3
------------- Release 3.2.4

26 September 2012
- Document the sslhashold gsi security option.
- Document vomsfun and vomsfunargs gsi switches

------------- Release 3.2.5 to 3.2.7
------------- Release 3.3.0 to 3.3.2

7 February 2013
- Add link to external plug-in for VOMS extraction
- Remove description of sslhashold which was suppressed because an automatic mechanism to handle hash algorithms has been implemented
- Regenerate index and fix some typos
-------------  Release 3.3.3 to 3.3.6
-------------  Release 4.0.1 to 4.0.3

15 October 2014
• Explain how to create forward-able sss tokens using xrdsssadmin.

-------------  Release 4.1.0 to 4.3.0
-------------  Release 4.4.0

19 June 2016
• Explain how to do authorization based on objected.

-------------  Release 4.5.0 to 4.6.0

9 October 2016
• Explain the sec.level directive.

-------------  Release 4.7.0

7 April 2017
• Document the ‘o’ and ‘r’ record types in the authorization database.

3 August 2017
• Document the ‘=’, ‘s’ and ‘x’ record types in the authorization database.

27 October 2017
• Correct the ‘=’ compound type specification.

20 June 2018
• Better document the dlgpxy gsi option.
• Document the extended expxy gsi option.
• Remove the redundant XrdSecGSISIGNPROXY client-side envvar.

22 July 2018
• Add fattr request to the signing table.
Authorization Database

12 March 2020
- Provide full names for single letter options for the sss protocol.
- Document the sss protocol –getcreds and –keyname options.
- Document proxy authentication for the sss protocol.

17 March 2020
- Documents the sec.entitylib directive.

16 May 2020
- Rewrite the gsi protocol section to make it more approachable.
- Add details on the VOMS plug-in.

19 May 2020
- Document the new version of the -vomsfunparms grpop option.

5 June 2020
- Document the new version of the –authzpxy, -ca, -crl, -dlgpxy, -gmapopt, and -vomsat gsi options.
- Document the -authzcall and -trustdns gsi options.
- Document the removal of the gsi built-in VOMS extractor and the change of the -vomsat option default to ignore.

11 November 2020
- Correct documentation on how to specify the idtype (i.e. the single letter is not followed by a colon).

15 January 2021
- Document the ztn client validation protocol.

15 February 2021
- Document -expiry option in the ztn client validation protocol.

17 February 2021
- Remove the controversial ztn options -rt and -use.

6 August 2021
- Document the acc.encoding directive

13 October 2022
- Do not imply that group name must be a Unix name in the auth DB file.
13 October 2022

- Document the gsi protocol `-showdn` option.